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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
3(A)(10) Financing: New Predatory Financing Using The Securities Act, Thomas S. Glassman
3(A)(10) Financing: New Predatory Financing Using The Securities Act, Thomas S. Glassman
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
The Section 3(a)(10) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 is meant to exempt securities transactions where a fairness hearing by a judge or government agency’s ruling replaces the usual SEC registration requirements. Recently, there has been a rise in 3(a)(10) financing schemes, where a third party investor, what I call a “3(a)(10) financier,” will offer to purchase the outstanding debts of a company from its creditors in exchange for discounted, and unregistered, shares of stock. In many cases these exchanges are done with no notification to current shareholders whose value falls precipitously when the 3(a)(10) financier begins not only …
Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon
Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical & Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, Christopher C. Mckinnon
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
“The advantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of shareholders.” Issuing dual classes of stock has become hotly debated since two major events transpired in 2014: (1) Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $19 billion and (2) Alibaba chose to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instead of the Hong Kong Exchange. Because dual-class managers, like those at Facebook and Alibaba, retain a controlling voting block, their decisions are immune from …