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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Corporations - Effect Of A Provision In Articles Of Incorporation Permitting The Counting Of Interested Directors For Quorum Purposes, James W. Callison S.Ed. Dec 1953

Corporations - Effect Of A Provision In Articles Of Incorporation Permitting The Counting Of Interested Directors For Quorum Purposes, James W. Callison S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiffs, minority stockholders, sought to restrain the consummation of a merger agreement between defendant Mayflower and Hilton corporations because the plan had not been approved by a quorum of disinterested directors of Mayflower. Defendants relied upon a provision in Mayflower's articles of incorporation which stated that " . . . any director may be counted in determining the existence of a quorum at any meeting of the Board of Directors of this Corporation for the purpose of authorizing any contract or transaction [between this Corporation and any other corporation in which any director or officer of this Corporation is pecuniarily …


Corporations - Securities Act Of 1933 - Stock Sale To Employees As A Public Offer, Paul B. Campbell S.Ed. Dec 1953

Corporations - Securities Act Of 1933 - Stock Sale To Employees As A Public Offer, Paul B. Campbell S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The Securities and Exchange Commission sued to enjoin defendant corporation from offering stock for sale to its employees without first complying with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. Defendant claimed that its offer was not a public offer and therefore it came under a class of transactions which were exempt from the registration requirements. The offer was made to about 500 of the company's 7,000 employees. The company classified the offer as one made only to ''key employees." The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for defendant. On certiorari, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. …


Corporations - Shareholders - Right To Bring Derivative Action For Treble Damages Under Antitrust Laws, William K. Davenport S.Ed. Nov 1953

Corporations - Shareholders - Right To Bring Derivative Action For Treble Damages Under Antitrust Laws, William K. Davenport S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff, owner of 50 percent of the stock in a theater corporation, brought a derivative action in federal court for treble damages for loss of profits allegedly suffered from defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. The district court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal to the court of appeals, held, reversed and remanded. Under the new federal rules, a stockholder may bring a derivative action for treble damages under the antitrust laws. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 731.


"Fair And Equitable" Distribution Of Voting Power Under The Public Utility Holding Company Act Of 1935, Leo W. Leary Nov 1953

"Fair And Equitable" Distribution Of Voting Power Under The Public Utility Holding Company Act Of 1935, Leo W. Leary

Michigan Law Review

In the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Commission the task of investigating voting power distribution among security holders in electric and gas holding companies and their subsidiaries. If the Commission finds that the corporate structure or continued existence of any company in a holding company system "unfairly or inequitably" distributes voting power among the investors in the system, it is the Commission's duty to order the offending corporation to take "such steps as the Commission shall find necessary" to cure this condition. This paper is an attempt to ascertain what the Commission …


Corporations - Stock Options - Requirements Of Consideration For Employee Options, George D. Miller, Jr. S.Ed. Feb 1953

Corporations - Stock Options - Requirements Of Consideration For Employee Options, George D. Miller, Jr. S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The Delaware court, in two recent decisions, has indicated what may be an increasingly strict attitude toward employee stock options, particularly when granted to executive officers or directors. It will be the purpose of this comment to examine the significance of these decisions, and to attempt to determine the extent of the change wrought by them.