Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Bylaw (1)
- Corporations (1)
- Delaware Court of Chancery (1)
- Delaware General Corporation Law (1)
- Derivative litigation (1)
-
- Forum selection (1)
- Markets; trading; securities; personal benefit (1)
- Proxy Puts (1)
- Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1)
- Securities law; securities exchange act; fraud; disclosure; civil law; litigation; corporations; shareholders; common law (1)
- Shareholder Activism (1)
- Wolf Pack; Section 13(d); Conscious Parallelism; activist; activism; hedge fund; group; activist; hedge fund activism; 13(d) group; wolf pack activism (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Forum Selection Provisions And The Preclusion Of Derivative Claims Under Section 14(A) Of The Securities Exchange Act: Should Federal Courts Intervene?, Noah P. Mathews
Forum Selection Provisions And The Preclusion Of Derivative Claims Under Section 14(A) Of The Securities Exchange Act: Should Federal Courts Intervene?, Noah P. Mathews
Fordham Law Review
This Note examines whether a forum selection provision in a corporation’s bylaws that requires shareholders to bring derivative claims in the Delaware Court of Chancery is enforceable when invoked by directors to dismiss derivative claims under the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”)—claims over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. In Seafarers Pension Plan ex rel. Boeing Co. v. Bradway, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that enforcing this type of bylaw would violate the act’s antiwaiver provision, which voids any stipulation that allows a person to waive compliance with the act. In Lee ex …
Breaking Up The Focus On Relationships For Nonpecuniary Insider Trading Personal Benefits, Bradley Larkin
Breaking Up The Focus On Relationships For Nonpecuniary Insider Trading Personal Benefits, Bradley Larkin
Fordham Law Review
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the “personal benefit” requirement as an objective test for insider trading to help determine when confidential information is tipped for an improper purpose. Under this test, a tipper acts improperly by receiving a personal benefit for sharing confidential, nonpublic information, even if the tipper does not trade using the information. For instance, when a tipper leaks confidential information to a trading friend or relative, the tipper benefits personally because this amounts to trading on the confidential information and then gifting the profits. The personal benefit requirement is applied differently among the circuits, however, …
Reviving Reliance, Ann M. Lipton
Reviving Reliance, Ann M. Lipton
Fordham Law Review
This Article explores the misalignment between the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws and the private causes of action available to investors to enforce those requirements. Historically, federally mandated disclosures were designed to allow investors to set an appropriate price for publicly traded securities. Today’s disclosures, however, also enable stockholders to participate in corporate governance and act as a check on managerial misbehavior. To enforce these requirements, investors’ chief option is a claim under the general antifraud statute, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. But courts are deeply suspicious of investors’ attempts to use the Act …
Keeping Shareholder Activism Alive: A Comparative Approach To Outlawing Dead Hand Proxy Puts In Delaware, Danielle A. Rapaccioli
Keeping Shareholder Activism Alive: A Comparative Approach To Outlawing Dead Hand Proxy Puts In Delaware, Danielle A. Rapaccioli
Fordham Law Review
Current trends in shareholder activism have brought to light the competing interests of management and stockholders. With a rise in shareholder activism, firms are continuing to include change in control provisions, known as proxy puts, in their debt agreements to counter activist success. Recent litigation regarding the use of these provisions has created a debate as to whether these provisions are valid under Delaware law. Moreover, companies and lending institutions have morphed these provisions into a more restrictive form, known as “dead hand proxy puts.” The controversy analyzed in this Note arises out of the use of dead hand proxy …
The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin
The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin
Fordham Law Review
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires all persons and groups that acquire 5 percent or more of an issuer’s outstanding stock to disclose their holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whether a group is formed under section 13(d) often is unclear. The legal precedent is ambiguous; courts give more weight to certain forms of circumstantial evidence than others without explaining why. With the substantial increase of hedge fund activism—in particular, the wolf pack tactic—further clarity or uniformity is necessary. A “wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation …