Securities Law Commons^™

Venture Capital Contract Design: An Empirical Analysis Of The Connection Between Bargaining Power And Venture Financing Contract Terms, Spencer Williams

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Article presents an empirical analysis of the connection between bargaining power and contract design using an original dataset of over 5,500 equity and debt venture financings from 2004–2015. Using the total supply of venture capital in the U.S. as a measure of relative bargaining power between entrepreneurs and investors, this Article finds that venture capital supply has a statistically significant relationship with price and non-price terms in both equity and debt financings. These results contradict one of three theoretical accounts of bargaining power and support the other two.

A Novel Approach To Defining "Whistleblower" In Dodd-Frank, Ian A. Engoron

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, trust in the financial industry was at an all-time low as the American taxpayer was forced to bailout the very same institutions responsible for their suffering. In response, Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 to ensure another crisis like 2008 never happen again. Section 78u-6 of the Act provides incentives and protections for whistleblowers who report violations of securities laws. In recent years there has been a divide among circuit courts over the question of whether employees who report violations internally to their bosses—and not directly to the SEC—are protected by the Act. Currently, the …

Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven M. Davidoff Solomon

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms including a requirement that large U.S. public companies provide their shareholders with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of executive compensation and to encourage boards to adopt compensation structures that tie executive pay more closely to performance. Although the literature is mixed, many studies question whether the statute has had the desired effect. Shareholders at most companies overwhelmingly approve the compensation packages, and pay levels continue to be high. Although a lack of …

The Tax Treatment Of Tokens: What Does It Betoken?, David J. Shakow

All Faculty Scholarship

Digital tokens have been used to raise substantial amounts of money. But little attention has been paid to the tax consequences surrounding their issuance and sale. There are significant potential tax liabilities lurking in the use of digital tokens. But, because of the anonymity inherent in the blockchain structures used for the issuance of tokens and payments for them, there is a significant question as to whether those tax liabilities will ever be collected.

Who Bleeds When The Wolves Bite? A Flesh-And-Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And Our Strange Corporate Governance System, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the effects of hedge fund activism and so-called wolf pack activity on the ordinary human beings—the human investors—who fund our capital markets but who, as indirect of owners of corporate equity, have only limited direct power to ensure that the capital they contribute is deployed to serve their welfare and in turn the broader social good.

Most human investors in fact depend much more on their labor than on their equity for their wealth and therefore care deeply about whether our corporate governance system creates incentives for corporations to create and sustain jobs for them. And because …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

What Exactly Is Market Integrity? An Analysis Of One Of The Core Objectives Of Securities Regulation, Janet Austin

William & Mary Business Law Review

One of the main objectives of securities regulation around the world is to protect the integrity or fairness of the markets. This, together with protecting investors, improving the efficiency of markets, and protecting the markets from systemic risk, form the four fundamental goals of securities regulation.

However, what exactly is envisaged by this concept of market integrity or fairness? Are these simply norms of behaviour incapable of further definition? Despite their importance, relatively little attention has been given to these concepts in the literature. Do they, for example, require securities regulators to just work towards eliminating dishonest trading practices such …

Quasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach Of Duty Of Disclosure Claims Following "Cash-Out" Mergers In Delaware, Zachary A. Paiva

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In recent years, Delaware has served as the hot bed for the dramatic increase in merger appraisal litigation and the proliferation of “appraisal arbitrage” whereby opportunistic shareholders buy into companies following merger announcements and challenge announced deal prices as an investment strategy. While this has not always proved profitable, it has increased scrutiny over the Delaware appraisal regime and the ability for shareholders to avail themselves of the opportunity for a judicial valuation of their shares. Furthermore, it has highlighted information asymmetries in which controlling shareholders, particularly those seeking to cash out their minority shareholders, are incentivized to underpay or …

The Seventeenth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities And Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center, Matthew Diller, Ben Indek, Ira D. Hammerman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Dodd-Frank And The Spoofing Prohibition In Commodities Markets, Meric Sar

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act and adopted an explicit prohibition regarding activity commonly known as spoofing in commodities markets. This Note argues that the spoofing prohibition is a necessary step towards improved market discipline and price integrity in the relevant commodities markets. It fills an important gap in the CEA in relation to an elusive form of price manipulation activity by providing an explicit statutory authority on which regulators and market operators may rely in policing suspect trading strategies falling under the spoofing umbrella.

Congress’ explicit denouncement of spoofing as an illegal act has ramifications not only …

Regulating A Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes To Smart Regulation, Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis, Douglas W. Arner

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Prior to the global financial crisis, financial innovation was viewed very positively, resulting in a laissez-faire, deregulatory approach to financial regulation. Since the crisis the regulatory pendulum has swung to the other extreme. Post-crisis regulation, plus rapid technological change, have spurred the development of financial technology (FinTech). FinTech firms and data-driven financial service providers profoundly challenge the current regulatory paradigm. Financial regulators increasingly seek to balance the traditional regulatory objectives of financial stability and consumer protection with promoting growth and innovation. The resulting regulatory innovations include RegTech, regulatory sandboxes, and special charters. This Article analyzes possible new regulatory approaches, ranging …

Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering The Excluded Retail Investor, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Despite the increasing importance of shareholder voting, regulators have paid little attention to the rights of retail investors who own approximately 30% of publicly traded companies but who vote less than 30% of their shares. A substantial factor contributing to this low turnout is the antiquated mechanism by which retail investors vote. The federal proxy voting rules place primary responsibility for facilitating retail voting in the hands of custodial brokers who have limited incentives to develop workable procedures, and current regulatory restrictions impede market-based innovation that incorporate technological innovations.

One of the most promising such innovations is standing voting instructions …

Regulatory Competition And The Market For Corporate Law, Ofer Eldar, Lorenzo Magnolfi

Faculty Scholarship

This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a novel database of incorporation decisions from 1995- 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms.Our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. Our findings support the hypothesis that …

The Deregulation Of Private Capital And The Decline Of The Public Company, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

From its inception, the federal securities law regime created and enforced a major divide between public and private capital raising. Firms that chose to “go public” took on substantial disclosure burdens, but in exchange were given the exclusive right to raise capital from the general public. Over time, however, the disclosure quid pro quo has been subverted: Public companies are still asked to disclose, yet capital is flooding into private companies with regulators’ blessing.

This Article provides a critique of the new public-private divide centered on its information effects. While regulators may have hoped for both the private and public …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.