Securities Law Commons^™

Securities Regulation And Social Media, Seth C. Oranburg

Law Faculty Scholarship

Federal securities regulation originally divided corporate finance into two neat categories, public and private. In 1933, private financing was limited to “sophisticated” investors but otherwise lightly regulated. Public financing became heavily regulated. In 1982, the SEC introduced Reg D, which introduced the concept of “general solicitation” to clarify the distinction between public and private offerings. Reg D is well understood to prohibit newspaper advertisements and permit direct solicitations to venture capital investors. This enabled great wealth consolidation in regions like Silicon Valley while effectively banning general solicitations in private offerings.

Now, social media communication challenges the definition of “general solicitation.” …

The Case Against Exempting Smaller Reporting Companies From Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: Why Market-Based Solutions Are Likely To Harm Ordinary Investors, John Orcutt

Law Faculty Scholarship

Section 404 is arguably the most controversial provision of Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”). The controversy focuses on whether Section 404’s substantial compliance costs exceed the statute’s benefits, with no consensus on Section 404’s cost-effectiveness. If Section 404 turns out to be cost-ineffective, the companies that are most threatened are smaller companies, as cost-ineffective regulations tend to disproportionately harm smaller companies. This Article considers whether Congress and the SEC should exempt smaller reporting companies from Section 404 compliance, as that would allow for a market-based resolution to the uncertain value of Section 404 for smaller reporting companies. Smaller reporting companies would be relieved …

Investor Skepticism V. Investor Confidence: Why The New Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, John L. Orcutt

Law Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this Article provides an overview of research analysts and their basic functions, including a discussion of sell-side analysts' role in the market's recent boom and bust. Part II examines the conflicts of interest that have plagued sell-side research, and Part III reviews the Regulatory Actions that are meant to address these conflicts. In Part IV, the author will make the case for encouraging, rather than lessening, investor skepticism in sell-side research and will explain why the Regulatory Actions are not likely to improve the performance of sell-side analysts. Finally, Part V will offer a simpler proposal to …