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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Criminal Subsidiaries, Andrew K. Jennings
Criminal Subsidiaries, Andrew K. Jennings
Faculty Articles
Corporate groups comprise parent companies and one or more subsidiaries, which parents use to manage liabilities, transactions, operations, and regulation. Those subsidiaries can also be used to manage criminal accountability when multiple entities within a corporate group share responsibility for a common offense. A parent, for instance, might reach a settlement with prosecutors that requires its subsidiary to plead guilty to a crime, without conviction of the parent itself—a subsidiary-only conviction (SOC). The parent will thus avoid bearing collateral consequences—such as contracting or industry bars—that would follow its own conviction. For the prosecutor, such settlements can respond to criminal law’s …
Disclosure Procedure, Andrew K. Jennings
Disclosure Procedure, Andrew K. Jennings
Faculty Articles
Securities disclosure is a human process. Each year, public companies collectively spend over fifteen million hours producing disclosures that undergird an equities market with tens of trillions in market capitalization. The procedures they follow in doing so affect whether their disclosures contain misstatements or omissions—errors that can cause trading losses for investors, and litigation for issuers. Yet despite the importance of the disclosures that firms produce, the literature says little about how they do it, including whether they are spending too much, too little, or just enough on their disclosure procedures. To fill that gap, this Article uses original surveys …
Is "Public Company" Still A Viable Regulatory Category?, George S. Georgiev
Is "Public Company" Still A Viable Regulatory Category?, George S. Georgiev
Faculty Articles
This Article suggests that the ubiquitous “public company” regulatory category, as currently constructed, has outlived its effectiveness in fulfilling core goals of the modern administrative state. An ever-expanding array of federal economic regulation hinges on public company status, but “public company” differs from most other regulatory categories in that it requires an affirmative opt-in by the subject entity. In practice, firms today become subject to public company regulation only if they need access to the public capital markets, which is much less of a business imperative than it once was due to the proliferation of private financing options. Paradoxically, then, …
The Sec’S Climate Disclosure Rule: Critiquing The Critics, George S. Georgiev
The Sec’S Climate Disclosure Rule: Critiquing The Critics, George S. Georgiev
Faculty Articles
Climate change is an existential phenomenon, which entails a wide variety of physical risks as well as sizeable but underappreciated economic risks. In March 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) moved to address some of the information gaps related to the effects of climate change on firms by proposing a rule that requires public companies to report detailed and standardized information about important climate-related matters for the benefit of investors and markets. Though the rule proposal was welcomed by many market participants, it was also met with a level of opposition that was unusual in both its intensity …
State Securities Enforcement, Andrew K. Jennings
State Securities Enforcement, Andrew K. Jennings
Faculty Articles
Each year, state securities regulators bring over twice the enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, yet their work is largely missing from the literature. This Article provides an institutional account of state securities enforcement and identifies two key advantages—detection granularity and institutional decentralization—that states enjoy over their federal counterparts in policing localized frauds involving individual, often small-dollar, victims. Although states share enforcement jurisdiction with the SEC and DOJ, their enforcement activity reflects their institutional advantages and constraints and thus largely does not overlap with that of federal authorities. Instead, states serve as the nation’s residual securities enforcers, …
Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev
Securities Disclosure As Soundbite: The Case Of Ceo Pay Ratios, Steven A. Bank, George S. Georgiev
Faculty Articles
This Article analyzes the history, design, and effectiveness of the highly controversial CEO pay ratio disclosure rule, which went into effect in 2018. Based on a regulatory mandate contained in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and median worker pay as part of their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The seven-year rulemaking process was politically contentious and generated a level of public engagement that was virtually unprecedented in the long history of the SEC disclosure regime. The SEC sought to minimize compliance costs by providing …
Shareholders United?, Andrew K. Jennings
Shareholders United?, Andrew K. Jennings
Faculty Articles
Securities regulation has a way of crossing into other lanes. What public companies do is substantive regulation. How they govern themselves while doing it-or more importantly, how they disclose it-is securities regulation. So it is no surprise that the perennial concern over regulating money in politics should also become a question of federal securities regulation. The Shareholders United Act (the "Act")-passed by the House of Representatives as part of House Bill 1, an early, major piece of legislation in the 116th Congress-does just that. The Act would require that before engaging in political spending, public companies poll shareholders on how …