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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

The Fsa, Integrated Regulation, And The Curious Case Of Otc Derivatives, Dan Awrey Oct 2010

The Fsa, Integrated Regulation, And The Curious Case Of Otc Derivatives, Dan Awrey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

With a view to better understanding the optimal structure of financial regulation, this paper tests prevailing theoretical hypotheses respecting the efficiency and overall desirability of integrated financial regulation relative to competing institutional models. This test is conducted through the lens of a comparative case study examining the approaches adopted by (fragmented) U.S financial regulators and the (integrated) UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) toward the myriad of regulatory challenges posed by the emergence, growth, and systemic importance of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. More specifically, this paper examines why, despite the numerous theoretical advantages of integrated regulation, the FSA adopted a non-interventionist …


Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner Aug 2010

Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Over recent decades, shareholders in public corporations have increasingly sought to augment their own power - and, correlatively, to limit the power of boards - through creative use of corporate bylaws. The bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally. In this Article I examine thecontested nature of bylaws, the fundamental issues of corporate power and purpose that they implicate, and the differing ways in which state and federal lawmakers and regulators may impact the debate regarding thescope of the shareholders' bylaw authority.

The …


The Role Of Derivatives In The Financial Crisis – Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, June 30, 2010, Michael Greenberger Jun 2010

The Role Of Derivatives In The Financial Crisis – Testimony Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, June 30, 2010, Michael Greenberger

Congressional Testimony

It is now almost universally accepted that the unregulated multi-trillion dollar OTC CDS market helped foment a mortgage crisis, then a credit crisis, and finally a ―once-in-a-century systemic financial crisis that, but for huge U.S. taxpayer interventions, would have in the fall of 2008 led the world economy into a devastating Depression. Before explaining below the manner in which credit default swaps fomented this crisis, it worth citing in the margin those many economists, regulators, market observers, and financial columnists who have described the central role unregulated CDS played in the crisis.

Even those once skeptical of arguments about the …


Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee Apr 2010

Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a case study of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the impact of a flawed merger execution on the board’s subsequent decisions. The second topical section, presented Parts II-IV of this Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. It nearly resulted in a collapse of the global capital markets. A key event in the history of …


Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller Mar 2010

Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller

Scholarly Works

While there are innumerable theories on the best remedy for the current financial crisis, there is agreement on one point, at least: increased transparency is good. We look at a provision from the last round of financial regulation, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed disclosure requirements tailored to prevent some of the kinds of abuses that led to the downfall of Enron. In response to Enron's self-dealing transactions, Section 406 of SOX required a public company to disclose its code of ethics and to disclose immediately any waivers from that code the company grants to its top …


Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee Jan 2010

Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a case study of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the impact of a flawed merger execution on the board’s subsequent decisions. The second topical section, presented Parts II-IV of this Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. It nearly resulted in a collapse of the global capital markets. A key event in the history of …


Trusts Versus Corporations: An Empirical Analysis Of Competing Organizational Forms, A. Joseph Warburton Jan 2010

Trusts Versus Corporations: An Empirical Analysis Of Competing Organizational Forms, A. Joseph Warburton

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

This paper studies the effects of organizational form on managerial behavior and firm performance, from an empirical perspective. Managers of trusts are subject to stricter fiduciary responsibilities than managers of corporations. This paper examines the ramifications empirically, by exploiting data generated by a change in British regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either a trust or a corporation. I find evidence that trust law is effective in curtailing opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than their observationally equivalent corporate counterparts. Trust managers also incur lower risk. However, evidence suggests that trust managers …


The Market Reaction To Legal Shocks And Their Antidotes: Lessons From The Sovereign Debt Market, Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, Mitu Gulati Jan 2010

The Market Reaction To Legal Shocks And Their Antidotes: Lessons From The Sovereign Debt Market, Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

In October 2000 a hedge fund holding an unpaid debt claim won an enormous victory against the debtor, the Republic of Peru, through an opportunistic interpretation of the common pari passu clause by a Brussels court. This development was met by charges from policy makers and practitioners that the court's decision (its novel interpretation of the pari passu clause) would lead to a dramatic increase in the risks of holdout litigation faced by sovereign debtors. Over the ensuing years, multiple reform solutions were proposed including the revision of certain contractual terms, the filing of amicus briefs in a key case, …


Too Big To Fail?: Recasting The Financial Safety Net, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2010

Too Big To Fail?: Recasting The Financial Safety Net, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Government safety nets in the United States and abroad focus, anachronistically, on problems of banks and other financial institutions, largely ignoring financial markets which have become major credit sources for consumers and companies. Besides failing to protect these markets, this narrow focus encourages morally hazardous behavior by large institutions, like AIG and Citigroup, that are "too big to fail." This paper examines how a safety net should be recast to protect financial markets and also explains why that safety net would mitigate moral hazard and help resolve the too-big-to-fail dilemma.


On Regulating Conflicts Of Interest In The Credit Rating Industry, Lin (Lynn) Bai Jan 2010

On Regulating Conflicts Of Interest In The Credit Rating Industry, Lin (Lynn) Bai

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This paper discusses issues giving rise to conflict of interest concerns in the credit rating industry and examines whether and how those issues are addressed in the current regulation that builds on the guidelines of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, the SEC rules that were initially adopted in 2007 and recently amended in 2009, and the internal code of conducts of rating agencies. The examination leads to a conclusion that conflict of interest at the individual rating analyst level and some concerns of conflict of interest at the agency level have been largely addressed in the current …


Distorting Legal Principles, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2010

Distorting Legal Principles, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Legal principles enable society to order itself by preserving broadly based expectations. Sometimes, however, parties transact in ways that are so inconsistent with generally accepted principles as to create uncertainty or confusion that undermines the basis for reasoning afforded by the principles. Such a distortion might occur, for example, if a normally mandatory legal rule were unexpectedly treated as a default rule. This article explores the problem of distorting legal principles, initially focusing on rehypothecation, a distortion whose uncertainty and confusion contributed to the downfall of Lehman Brothers and the resulting global financial crisis. But not all distortions are, on …


Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2010

Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, …


Banks And Brokers And Bricks And Clicks: An Evaluation Of Finra's Proposal To Modify The "Bank Broker-Dealer Rule", Jill I. Gross Jan 2010

Banks And Brokers And Bricks And Clicks: An Evaluation Of Finra's Proposal To Modify The "Bank Broker-Dealer Rule", Jill I. Gross

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

As discussed in this article, the proposed rule change protects bank customers who may be solicited for the purchase of investment products and services, but only to a limited extent. It does not rectify sales practices of broker-dealers--affiliated with financial institutions--which tend to confuse, and even mislead, financially unsophisticated investors of modest means who can least afford to be exposed to excessive risk. Additionally, the proposed rule change adds no meaningful surveillance, inspection, enforcement, or punitive mechanisms to prevent and/or redress insidious practices that are akin to “bait and switch” tactics and are particularly effective against financially unsophisticated investors. In …


The Wisdom Of Crowds? Groupthink And Nonprofit Governance, Melanie B. Leslie Jan 2010

The Wisdom Of Crowds? Groupthink And Nonprofit Governance, Melanie B. Leslie

Articles

Scandals involving nonprofit boards and conflicts of interest continue to receive considerable public attention. Earlier this year, for example, musician Wyclef Jean's Yele Haiti charity became the target of intense criticism after the charity disclosed that it had regularly transacted business with Jean and entities controlled by Jean and other directors. Although scandals caused by self-dealing undermine public confidence in the charitable sector, they continue to erupt. Why do charitable boards sanction transactions with insiders?

This Article argues that much of the blame lies with the law itself. Because fiduciary duty law is currently structured as a set of fuzzy …


Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, Houman B. Shadab Jan 2010

Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, Houman B. Shadab

Articles & Chapters

A wide range of U.S. policymakers initiated a series of actions in 2008 and 2009 to bring greater regulation and oversight to credit default swaps (CDSs) and other over-the-counter derivatives. The policymakers’ stated motivations echoed widely expressed criticisms of the regulation, characteristics, and practices of the CDS market, and focused on the risks of the instruments and the lack of public transparency over their utilization and execution. Certainly, the misuse of certain CDSs enabled mortgage-related security risk to become overconcentrated in some financial institutions.

Yet as the analysis in this Article suggests, failing to distinguish between CDS derivatives and the …