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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Clients As Teachers, Barbara Glesner Fines
Nasd Regulation Of Ipo Conflicts Of Interest - Does Gatekeeping Work?, Royce De R. Barondes
Nasd Regulation Of Ipo Conflicts Of Interest - Does Gatekeeping Work?, Royce De R. Barondes
Faculty Publications
This Article contributes to the debate on the efficacy of third party gatekeeping in regulating the capital markets, by presenting empirical evidence of the efficacy of one kind of gatekeeper, a qualified independent underwriter (QIU). Under NASD rules, when an investment bank participating in a securities offering has one of several enumerated conflicts of interest, the securities cannot be sold at a price higher than that recommended by a QIU. Examining 1,188 IPOs from 1997 through 2000 discloses a negative, statistically significant relationship between IPO initial returns and each of (i) the fact that participating NASD members (or their affiliates) …
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility: What Regulation By The Securities And Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, Roberta S. Karmel
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility: What Regulation By The Securities And Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, Roberta S. Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility - What Regulation By The Securities And Exchange Commission Is Appropriate, Roberta S. Karmel
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility - What Regulation By The Securities And Exchange Commission Is Appropriate, Roberta S. Karmel
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Sec And Accounting, In Part Through The Eyes Of Pacioli, Matthew J. Barrett
The Sec And Accounting, In Part Through The Eyes Of Pacioli, Matthew J. Barrett
Journal Articles
As part of a symposium marking the seventieth anniversary of the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, this article pulls together two threads, namely Luca Pacioli's prominence in accounting and the importance of the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) requirements that seek to give investors an opportunity to view a public company through the eyes of management, to evaluate the SEC's record on certain accounting issues. Because writers in legal journals have largely ignored Pacioli's efforts, the article begins by highlighting some of the friar's contributions to accounting precepts. The article next applies some of those precepts in a …
Correcting The Empirical Foundations Of Ipo-Pricing Regulation, Royce De R. Barondes
Correcting The Empirical Foundations Of Ipo-Pricing Regulation, Royce De R. Barondes
Faculty Publications
Recent events are replete with stories of fraudulent or opportunistic behavior in the initial public offering (IPO) process - behavior that extended to the highest-reputation investment banks. Curiously, notwithstanding this evidence, recent financial economics literature asserts investment bank conflicts of interest certify IPO issuers. This Article develops new empirical evidence that casts doubt on this certification hypothesis by examining the pre-IPO price adjustment of IPOs involving qualified independent underwriters (QIUs), particularly IPOs in which more than ten percent of the net proceeds are being directed to participating investment banks (e.g., to repay a prior extension of credit). These offerings have …
Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon
Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …