Securities Law Commons^™

Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access And The Recent Phenomenon Of Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies, Danielle Vukovich

San Diego International Law Journal

Shareholders hold a financial stake in a corporation, and therefore are often viewed as owners of the corporation and believed to be in control for all corporate actions. However, their powers are circumscribed. Board of directors committees nominate directors to serve the corporation and these directors have the power to select the corporation’s officers. The committees provide shareholders a slate of proposed directors that are voted on and approved at the annual shareholder meeting. Shareholders may also propose their own slate of directors, but this typically requires a proxy contest, which can be expensive due to the costs both associated …

Basel Iii And Credit Risk Measurement: Variations Among G20 Countries, Matt Schlickenmaier

San Diego International Law Journal

Most countries require banks to hold extra capital to protect against unforeseen financial calamities; banks with riskier loans must hold more capital than those with safer loans. Basel II, a set of international banking standards, allows banks to measure a loan’s risk in different ways: some banks make their own judgments; others use outside agencies. The recent mortgage crisis prompted banks to reevaluate these methods, in part due to banks having failed to perceive the high level of risk inherent in securitized mortgages. The international community’s response was Basel III, an updated version of its previous standards. This Comment will …

The Trouble With Investment Banking: Cluelessness, Not Greed, Will Bunting

San Diego Law Review

We assume that the set of marketable financial instruments can be divided into two distinct categories: (1) easy to price and (2) difficult to price, and then isolate two behavioral effects as most important with respect to securities trading in difficult-to-price securities; specifically, the "house money effect" and the "earned money effect." It is shown that these behavioral effects discourage profitable investment in research effort.

We then argue that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) safe harbor should not apply to investment banks that issue/underwrite difficult-to-price securities. We also advocate for the return of the private investment banking partnership …

Overseeing Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling In Taiwan?, Yu-Hsin Lin

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article intends to explore the extent to which independent directors constrain tunneling by controlling shareholders in Taiwan. Taiwan serves as an appropriate jurisdiction for research since the private benefits agency problem is prevalent among Taiwanese public companies. A further twist in Taiwan?s case is that independent directors were newly introduced to Taiwan?s corporate boards, which follow dual-board system where the traditional monitoring function is served by statutory supervisors, instead of board committees, which adds to the complexity in analyzing the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining tunneling activities. Part II reviews relevant literature and lays the foundation for this …

Evolving Regulation Of Corporate Governance And The Implications For D&O Liability: The United States And Australia, Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen, Austin W. Hall, Andrew Jones

San Diego International Law Journal

This Article compares the modern corporate regulatory environments in the United States and Australia, including an analysis of the climate for Directors & Officers (D & O) liability coverage. Comparing these regulations across two large markets with similar historical bases for assessing director and officer liability allows us to explore which reforms may be more effective as new scandals emerge.