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Securities Law Commons

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Agency

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Conflicts of interest

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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten May 2011

Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potential for agency conflicts in mutual funds, whose advisors have the de facto power to award themselves high fees. While the surrounding debate has focused on the extent to which market competition replaces the need for fee litigation, there appears to be a growing consensus that fund governance, through the use of voice, is unlikely to be effective. The use of voice is commonly said to be hampered by collective action problems. More recently, scholars have argued that it is further weakened by the easy availability …


Chinese Wall Or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts Of Interest Of Securities Firms In The U.S. And The U.K., Norman S. Poser Jan 1988

Chinese Wall Or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts Of Interest Of Securities Firms In The U.S. And The U.K., Norman S. Poser

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article has two principal theses. The first is that, while Chinese Walls of securities firms are undoubtedly useful in some instances in preventing the flow of confidential information, the evidence that they actually do this is insufficient to justify basing a legal defense on the existence of a wall in a particular firm. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that at some firms the Chinese Wall is nothing but a convenient fiction aimed at avoiding liability for market abuses. The article's second thesis is that the isolation of information within a department of a firm which …