Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Agency (1)
- Agency Theory (1)
- Compliance and information technology; Dashboard compliance; Values compliance; Reasonable supervision; Broker-dealers; Investment advisers; Compliance officers; Compliance culture; Financial regulations; Data mining; Productivity of compliance officers; Technology oversight; Automated/ algorithmic trading; Letters of Credit; Big Data; Insider trading; Corporate governance (1)
- Compliance and technology; Self-regulatory organizations (SROs); Compliance; Financial regulations; Automated information gathering; Automated surveillance; Public disclosure; Information dissemination; Recordkeeping and reporting requirements; Dodd-Frank; Financial technology; Data analytics; Marketplace risks; Real-time regulation; Prophylactic regulation; “Regulation by enforcement” model; Empirical rulemaking; Culture of compliance; Homogenization of compliance practices; Cybersecurity; Human agency in compliance; Investment advisers; Broker-dealers; Regulatory performance standards; Revolving door; Corporate governance (1)
- Corporate Law (1)
-
- Corporate Theory (1)
- Corporations (1)
- Law and Economics (1)
- Securities regulation; Investment advisers; Third party examiners; Third party examination models; Self-regulatory Organizations (SROs); Arbitrary and Capricious Standard; Administrative Procedure Act (APA); Administrative Rulemaking; Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; “Reasonably designed to prevent fraud” test; Unauthorized tax; Congress’s Power of the Purse; Securities regulation; Compliance policies and procedures; Adviser examinations; Nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs); Proxy advisory firms; Certified Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute/CFA; Public company auditors; Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs); Compliance audits and reviews; Internal controls; Cost-benefit analysis; Financial regulation (1)
- Shareholders (1)
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Preserving Human Agency In Automated Compliance, Onnig H. Dombalagian
Preserving Human Agency In Automated Compliance, Onnig H. Dombalagian
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
As technology transforms financial services, so too must it transform the regulation of financial markets and intermediaries. The imperative of real-time, prophylactic regulation increasingly compels reallocation of regulatory and compliance budgets to surveillance and enforcement technology. At the same time, in light of the well-known weaknesses of automated systems, securities firms (and their regulators) must temper investment in automation with efforts to augment the agency of compliance professionals. This symposium contribution considers how investment in the professional development of compliance personnel can better integrate automated tools within established compliance and supervisory structures and thereby advance regulatory and operational objectives.
Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto
Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, Or Both?, James Fanto
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
This Article poses the basic question that is reflected in its title and that was the subject of the conference where the Article was initially presented: whether technology poses any threats to the mission of compliance and the position of compliance officers, whether it is just another useful tool for them, or whether it is something of both. It begins by explaining the origin of compliance in broker-dealers and investment advisers and its important current position in those firms. It then discusses why compliance officers have always been drawn to technology, particularly to keep up with the business sides of …
Mandatory Third Party Compliance Examinations For Investment Advisers: An Sec Waterloo?, Mercer Bullard
Mandatory Third Party Compliance Examinations For Investment Advisers: An Sec Waterloo?, Mercer Bullard
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) appears to be on the verge of requiring investment advisers to undergo third party examinations. One justification for the rulemaking is that the Commission lacks sufficient resources to examine advisers frequently enough. Another is to create indirectly a self-regulatory organization (SRO) for investments advisers. Both may leave a rulemaking particularly vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act. This Article considers three novel grounds on which a rulemaking may be successfully challenged. Congress has repeatedly rejected SEC requests to provide additional funding for examinations or to create an …
Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin
Agency Theory As Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts, And Fund Managers Perform Their Roles, Jiwook Jung, Frank Dobbin
Seattle University Law Review
In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling published a paper reintroducing agency theory that explained how the modern corporation is structured to serve dispersed shareholders. They purported to describe the world as it exists but, in fact, they described a utopia, and their piece was read as a blueprint for that utopia. We take a page from the sociology of knowledge to argue that, in the modern world, economic theories function as prescriptions for behavior as much as they function as descriptions. Economists and management theorists often act as prophets rather than scientists, describing the world not as it is, …