Securities Law Commons^™

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise contours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rulemaking to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rulemaking to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of …

The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable And The Future Of Sec Rulemaking, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The Securities and Exchange Commission has suffered a number of recent setbacks in areas ranging from enforcement policy to rulemaking. The DC Circuit’s 2011 Business Roundtable decision is one of the most serious, particularly in light of the heavy rulemaking obligations imposed on the SEC by Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act. The effectiveness of the SEC in future rulemaking and the ability of its rules to survive legal challenge are currently under scrutiny.

This article critically evaluates the Business Roundtable decision in the context of the applicable statutory and structural constraints on SEC rulemaking. Toward that end, the essay questions …

Enforcement Without Foundation? Insider Trading And China's Administrative Law Crisis, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

China's securities regulator enforces insider trading prohibitions pursuant to non-legal and non-regulatory internal "guidance." Reported agency decisions indicate that enforcement against insider trading is often possible only pursuant to this guidance, as the behavior identified is far outside of the scope of insider trading liability provided for in statute or regulation. I argue that the agency guidance is itself unlawful and unenforceable, because: (i) the guidance is not the regulatory norm required by the statutory delegation of power; and (ii) the guidance is ultra vires because (a) it addresses something substantively different from what is authorized under the statutory delegation, …

The Sec And The Future Of Corporate Governance, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

Section 14(E) Of The Williams Act And The Rule 10b-5 Comparisons, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

The passage of the Williams Act in 1968 added a set of provisions to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to govern tender offers. In this article, Professor Loewenstein examines the antifraud provision of the Williams Act, codified as section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the development of decisional law under it. After discussing the propriety of inferring a private cause of action from section 14(e), Professor Loewenstein argues that the judiciary's reliance on rule 10b-5 precedents to set the bounds of the 14(e) cause of action is unwarranted. He concludes: 1) that scienter should not …