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Full-Text Articles in Science and Technology Law
Probability, Individualization, And Uniqueness In Forensic Science Evidence: Listening To The Academies, David H. Kaye
Probability, Individualization, And Uniqueness In Forensic Science Evidence: Listening To The Academies, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
Day in and day out, criminalists testify to positive, uniquely specific identifications of fingerprints, bullets, handwriting, and other trace evidence. A committee of the National Academy of Sciences, building on the writing of academic commentators, has called for sweeping changes in the presentation and production of evidence of identification. These include some form of circumscribed and standardized testimony. But the Academy report is short on the specifics of the testimony that would be legally and professionally allowable. This essay outlines possible types of testimony that might harmonize the testimony of criminalists with the actual state of forensic science. It does …
Identification, Individualization, Uniqueness, David H. Kaye
Identification, Individualization, Uniqueness, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
Criminalists and many forensic scientists concerned with the identification of trace evidence have distinguished between identification and individualization, but they have not distinguished as precisely between individualization and uniqueness. This paper clarifies these terms and discusses the relationships among identification, individualization, and uniqueness in forensic-science evidence.
Case Comment - People V. Nelson: A Tale Of Two Statistics, David H. Kaye
Case Comment - People V. Nelson: A Tale Of Two Statistics, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
In recent years, defendants who were identified as a result of a search through a database of DNA profiles have argued that the probability that a randomly selected person would match a crime-scene stain overstates the probative value of the match. The statistical literature is divided, with most statisticians who have written on the subject rejecting this claim. In People v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of California held that when the random-match probability is so small as to make it exceedingly unlikely that any unrelated individual has the incriminating DNA profile, this statistic is admissible in a database-search case. …
'False But Highly Persuasive:' How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye
'False But Highly Persuasive:' How Wrong Were The Probability Estimates In Mcdaniel V. Brown?, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court will review the use of DNA evidence in a 1994 trial for sexual assault and attempted murder. The Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural issues - the standard of federal postconviction review of a state jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court's decision to allow the prisoner to supplement the record of trials, appeals, and state postconviction proceedings with a geneticist's letter twelve years after the trial.
This essay clarifies the nature and extent of the errors in the presentation of the DNA evidence in Brown. It questions …
Credal Probability, David H. Kaye
Credal Probability, David H. Kaye
David Kaye
This article responds to Paul Bergman and Al Moore's doubt that ideal triers of facts would be Bayesians. They argue that Bayes' rule, and probability theory in general, fails as a theoretical factfinding model. While probability has long been an accepted measure of belief in empirical propositions and the validity of inductive arguments, this articles addresses Bergman and Moore's doubts directly. It shows how their examples demonstrating the "frequentist" character of Bayesian methodology or the fallacies in Bayesian analysis are easily handled without a frequentist interpretation of probability. Then it shows that an ideal juror's partial beliefs will conform to …