Rule of Law Commons^™

Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai

Michigan Law Review

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …

Back To The Briarpatch: An Argument In Favor Of Constitutional Meta-Analysis In State Action Determinations, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Brer Rabbit, after claiming repeatedly that he would prefer almost anything to being thrown into the briarpatch, expressed glee once tossed there. In fact, Brer Rabbit wanted to be in the briarpatch because, like most rabbits, he could navigate the briarpatch with relative ease: the briarpatch was home.

Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed a great degree of familiarity with the state action doctrine, a doctrinal briar patch. Like Brer Rabbit, the Court has disclaimed repeatedly any interest in being there.

In this article, I argue that the existing tests for establishing the presence of …

Law Without Mind, Steven D. Smith

Michigan Law Review

A large part of the work done by lawyers and judges involves the interpretation of enacted law - primarily, statutes and the Constitution. Not surprisingly, legal scholars offer a good deal of advice, usually unsolicited, about how the task of interpretation should be performed. At present, such scholarly advice commonly recommends variations on an approach that may be called "present-oriented interpretation." This approach discourages judges from equating a law with its historical meaning or "original understanding." Instead, it urges them to construe statutes and constitutional provisions in a way that will render the law "the best it can be" in …

Legality And Empathy, Lynne N. Henderson

Michigan Law Review

This article rejects the assumption that legality - by which I mean the dominant belief system about the Rule and role of Law - and empathy are mutually exclusive concepts. Failure to recognize the phenomenon of empathy explicitly in legal decisions more generally may result from a fear of the emotional realm as irrational, rather than a rational. It may stem from a belief that the divide between "subject" and "object" is uncrossable. The resistance to empathy may be attributable to the adversarial ideology acquired during law school understanding the adversary is not important unless it serves one's instrumental …

Legislation On The American Frontier: Adoption Of Laws By Governor And Judges-Northwest Territory 1788-1798: Indiana Territory 1800-1804; Michigan Territory 1805-1823, William Wirt Blume

Michigan Law Review

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 made provisions for legislation by the territorial government in two stages: (1) adoption of laws by the governor and judges from the laws of the original states, and (2) enactment of statutes by a legislature made up of the governor, a council, and elected representatives. The first method was to be followed until the population should reach 5,000 and the second method thereafter. The present study is limited to the first stage.

The Rule Of Law And The Judicial Process, Luke K. Cooperrider

Michigan Law Review

An anecdote which I believe I recall from one of Professor Brogan's ·writings concerns a conversation between the archbishop and the chief justice about the relative importance of their respective powers. After the conversation had continued for some time the archbishop sought to administer the coup de grâce. "I have the advantage of you, your lordship, because you see, in the long run, the most you can say to a man is, 'You shall be hanged!' whereas it is within the functions of my office to say, 'You shall be damned!' " To this, after a moment of thought, …