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Full-Text Articles in Rule of Law
Re-Reading Chevron, Thomas W. Merrill
Re-Reading Chevron, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
Though increasingly disfavored by the Supreme Court, Chevron remains central to administrative law doctrine. This Article suggests a way for the Court to reformulate the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. Through careful attention to the language of Chevron itself, the Court can honor the decision’s underlying value of harnessing comparative institutional advantage in judicial review, while setting aside a highly selective reading that unduly narrows judicial review. This re-reading would put the Chevron doctrine – and with it, an entire branch of administrative law – on firmer footing.
The Uncertain Future Of Administrative Law, Jeremy K. Kessler, Charles F. Sabel
The Uncertain Future Of Administrative Law, Jeremy K. Kessler, Charles F. Sabel
Faculty Scholarship
A volatile series of presidential transitions has only intensified the century-long conflict between progressive defenders and conservative critics of the administrative state. Yet neither side has adequately confronted the fact that the growth of uncertainty and the corresponding spread of guidance – a kind of provisional “rule” that invites its own revision – mark a break in the development of the administrative state as significant as the rise of notice-and-comment rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas rulemaking corrected social shortsightedness by enlisting science in the service of lawful administration, guidance acknowledges that both science and law are in need …
Trade, Law And Product Complexity, Katharina Pistor, Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius
Trade, Law And Product Complexity, Katharina Pistor, Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius
Faculty Scholarship
How does the quality of national institutions that enforce the rule of law influence international trade? Anderson and Marcouiller argue that bad institutions located in the importer’s country deter international trade because they enable economic predators to steal and extort rents at the importer’s border. We complement this research and show how good institutions located in the exporter’s country enhance international trade, in particular, trade in complex products whose characteristics are difficult to fully specify in a contract. We argue that both exporter and importer institutions affect international as well as domestic transaction costs in complex and simple product markets. …