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- Comparative Law; Judges; Transnational Law (3)
- Arrow Theorem (1)
- Central American Integration (1)
- Collective irrationality (1)
- Condorcet cycling (1)
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- Constitutional Law (1)
- Democractic decisionmaking (1)
- Economics (1)
- General Law (1)
- Impossibility Theorem (1)
- Interpersonal Comparison of Utilities (1)
- Judicial Dialogue; Hegelism; symbolic Constitutionalisation (1)
- Jurisprudence (1)
- Justice (1)
- Kenneth J. Arrow (1)
- Law and Economics (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Politics (1)
- Public Law and Legal Theory (1)
- Regional Integration; Central American Identity; Constitutional Borrowing (1)
- Social Choice Theory (1)
- Transnational Constitutional Law; European Law (1)
- Publication
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Rule of Law
Judicial Re-Use:«Codification» Or Return Of Hegelism? The Comparative Arguments In The “South” Of The World, Prof. Michele Carducci
Judicial Re-Use:«Codification» Or Return Of Hegelism? The Comparative Arguments In The “South” Of The World, Prof. Michele Carducci
Michele Carducci Prof.
No abstract provided.
The Central American Constitutional Identity. A Study Of The Constitutional Imitation Phenomenon In The Integration Process Of The Region, Prof. Michele Carducci
The Central American Constitutional Identity. A Study Of The Constitutional Imitation Phenomenon In The Integration Process Of The Region, Prof. Michele Carducci
Michele Carducci Prof.
No abstract provided.
Is “Transnational” Constitutional Law Possible?, Prof. Michele Carducci
Is “Transnational” Constitutional Law Possible?, Prof. Michele Carducci
Michele Carducci Prof.
No abstract provided.
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …