Rule of Law Commons^™

Presidential Accountability And The Rule Of Law: Can The President Claim Immunity If He Shoots Someone On Fifth Avenue?, Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Richard Painter

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Can a sitting President be indicted while in office? This critical constitutional question has never been directly answered by any court or legislative body. The prevailing wisdom, however, is that, though he may be investigated, a sitting President is immune from actual prosecution. The concept of presidential immunity, however, has hastened the erosion of checks and balances in the federal government and weakened our ability to rein in renegade Presidents. It has enabled sitting Presidents to impede the enforcement of subpoenas and other tools of investigation by prosecutors, both federal and state, as well as to claim imperviousness to civil …

The Subversions And Perversions Of Shadow Vigilantism, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson

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This excerpt from the recently published Shadow Vigilantes book argues that, while vigilantism, even moral vigilantism, can be dangerous to a society, the real danger is not of hordes of citizens, frustrated by the system’s doctrines of disillusionment, rising up to take the law into their own hands. Frustration can spark a vigilante impulse, but such classic aggressive vigilantism is not the typical response. More common is the expression of disillusionment in less brazen ways by a more surreptitious undermining and distortion of the operation of the criminal justice system.

Shadow vigilantes, as they might be called, can affect the …

Justice Scalia’S Originalism And Formalism: The Rule Of Criminal Law As A Law Of Rules, Stephanos Bibas

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Far too many reporters and pundits collapse law into politics, assuming that the left–right divide between Democratic and Republican appointees neatly explains politically liberal versus politically conservative outcomes at the Supreme Court. The late Justice Antonin Scalia defied such caricatures. His consistent judicial philosophy made him the leading exponent of originalism, textualism, and formalism in American law, and over the course of his three decades on the Court, he changed the terms of judicial debate. Now, as a result, supporters and critics alike start with the plain meaning of the statutory or constitutional text rather than loose appeals to legislative …

How Being Right Can Risk Wrongs, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson

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This is a chapter from the new book The Vigilante Echo. Previous chapters have made clear that some vigilantism can be morally justified where the government has failed in its promise under the social contract to protect and to do justice. But this chapter explains how even moral vigilante action can be problematic for the larger society. Vigilantes may try to do the right thing but are likely to lack the training and professional neutrality of police. They may be successful, but only on pushing the crime problem to an adjacent neighborhood. Because their open lawbreaking may seem admirable …

Shadow Vigilante Officials Manipulate And Distort To Force Justice From An Apparently Reluctant System, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson

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The real danger of the vigilante impulse is not of hordes of citizens, frustrated by the system’s doctrines of disillusionment, rising up to take the law into their own hands. Frustration can spark a vigilante impulse but such classic aggressive vigilantism is not the typical response. More common is the expression of disillusionment in less brazen ways, by a more surreptitious undermining and distortion of the operation of the criminal justice system.

Shadow vigilantes, as they might be called, can affect the operation of the system in a host of important ways. For example, when people act as classic vigilantes …

The Moral Vigilante And Her Cousins In The Shadows, Paul H. Robinson

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By definition, vigilantes cannot be legally justified – if they satisfied a justification defense, for example, they would not be law-breakers – but they may well be morally justified, if their aim is to provide the order and justice that the criminal justice system has failed to provide in a breach of the social contract. Yet, even moral vigilantism is detrimental to society and ought to be avoided, ideally not by prosecuting moral vigilantism but by avoiding the creation of situations that would call for it. Unfortunately, the U.S. criminal justice system has adopted a wide range of criminal law …

Preventive Justice And The Presumption Of Innocence, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence.

After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive …

Political Versus Administrative Justice, Stephanos Bibas

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This comment responds to an essay by Rachel Barkow, which insightfully links the decline of mercy in American criminal justice to the rise of a rule-of-law ideal inspired by administrative law. This comment notes the dangers of the administrative, rule-focused, judiciocentric approach to criminal justice. Instead, it suggests a more political approach, with more judicial deference to political actors and less judicial policing of equal treatment. The essay by Rachel Barkow to which this comment responds, as well as other authors' comments on this essay and the author's reply to those comments, can be found at http://www.law.upenn.edu/phr/conversations/status/

In Defense Of The Model Penal Code: A Reply To Professor Fletcher, Paul H. Robinson

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No abstract provided.

Legality And Discretion In The Distribution Of Criminal Sanctions, Paul H. Robinson

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The judicial system now responds to criminal conduct in two rather divergent steps. A judge or jury first determines if a defendant should be held liable for a criminal offense. If so, then the judge or jury goes on to choose a penalty. Precise rules, designed to ensure fairness and predictability, govern the first stage, liability assignment. In the second stage, sentencing, however, judges and juries exercise broad discretion in meting out sanctions. In this Article, Professor Robinson argues that both liability assignment and sentencing are part of a single process of punishing criminal behavior and should be made more …

A Sentencing System For The 21st Century?, Paul H. Robinson

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The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing Commission and directed it to devise sentencing guidelines for the federal criminal justice system. The Commission recently fulfilled this mandate, promulgating a final set of rules, which took effect November 1. Commissioner Robinson, in filing the lone dissent to these guidelines, argued that they neither meet the expectations of the Act nor provide a comprehensive and workable system. In this Article, Commissioner Robinson discusses the necessary components of a modern, principled, and workable system. He first identifies an ideal system by describing its primary goals and by offering the …

Dissenting View Of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson To The Proposed Sentencing Guidelines For United State Courts, Paul H. Robinson

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I believe the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the United States Sentencing Commission, contains two main directives. First, the Commission's guidelines must provide a rational and principled sentencing system that will further the purposes of just punishment and crime control. Second, the guidelines must reduce unwarranted disparity among sentences for similar offenders who commit similar offenses. The Act provides that this is to be achieved through the Commission's promulgation of a comprehensive sentencing system that will bind all federal judges. I opposed the Commission's Preliminary Draft of September, 1986, because I saw it as lacking both guiding principles …