Rule of Law Commons^™

The Democracy Principle In State Constitutions, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Miriam Seifter

Michigan Law Review

In recent years, antidemocratic behavior has rippled across the nation. Lame-duck state legislatures have stripped popularly elected governors of their powers; extreme partisan gerrymanders have warped representative institutions; state officials have nullified popularly adopted initiatives. The federal Constitution offers few resources to address these problems, and ballot-box solutions cannot work when antidemocratic actions undermine elections themselves. Commentators increasingly decry the rule of the many by the few.

This Article argues that a vital response has been neglected. State constitutions embody a deep commitment to democracy. Unlike the federal Constitution, they were drafted—and have been repeatedly rewritten and amended— to empower …

Beyond Qualified Immunity, Fred O. Smith Jr.

Michigan Law Review Online

I never watched the video. The descriptions themselves have always felt like enough. Traumatizing enough. Invasive enough. George Floyd, father of two, laying on the ground, as an unfazed officer kneeled on his neck for at least eight minutes and forty-six seconds. He pleaded for his life and cried out to his deceased mother until he met his inevitable death. His name should be said for the record before saying almost anything else. The recording of the chilling final minutes of his life is, in all probability, one of the impetuses for this multi-journal Reckoning and Reform Symposium.

The Republic In Long-Term Perspective, Richard Primus

Michigan Law Review Online

Every system of government eventually passes away. That's a feature of the human condition. The United States has been an unusually stable polity by the standards of world civilizations, and for that stability Americans should be deeply grateful. But no nation is exempt from the basic forces of history. It is not reasonable to think that the constitutional republic we know will last forever. The question is when it will meet its end-in our lifetimes, or in our grandchildren's, or centuries later. Given the stable conditions that living Americans were socialized to expect, the dominant intuition is probably something like …

Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman

Articles

Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …

Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai

Michigan Law Review

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …

Public Consensus As Constitutional Authority, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Barry Friedman's new book The Will of the People attempts to dissolve constitutional law's countermajoritariand ifficulty by showing that, in practice,t he Supreme Court does only what the public will tolerate. His account succeeds if "the countermajoritarian difficulty" refers to the threat that courts will run the country in ways that contravene majority preference, but not if the "the countermajoritarian difficulty" refers to the need to explain the legitimate sources of judicial authority in cases where decisions do contravene majority preference. Friedman's book does not pursue the second possibility, and may suggest that doing so is unimportant, in part because …

Connecting The Dots Between The Constitution, The Marshall Trilogy, And United States V. Lara: Notes Toward A Blueprint For The Next Legislative Restoration Of Tribal Sovereignty, Ann E. Tweedy

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This law review Article examines: (1) the underpinnings of tribal sovereignty within the American system; (2) the need for restoration based on the Court's drastic incursions on tribal sovereignty over the past four decades and the grave circumstances, particularly tribal governments' inability to protect tribal interests on the reservation and unchecked violence in Indian Country, that result from the divestment of tribal sovereignty; (3) the concept of restoration as illuminated by United States v. Lara, and finally (4) some possible approaches to partial restoration.

The Article first evaluates the constitutional provisions relating to Indians and the earliest federal Indian law …

Interrogation Of Detainees: Extending A Hand Or A Boot?, Amos N. Guiora

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The current "war on terror" provides the Bush administration with a unique opportunity to both establish clear guidelines for the interrogation of detainees and to make a forceful statement about American values. How the government chooses to act can promote either an ethical commitment to the norms of civil society, or an attitude analogous to Toby Keith's "American Way," where Keith sings that "you'll be sorry that you messed with the USofA, 'Cuz we'll put a boot in your ass, It's the American Way."

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.

Emergency Federalism: Calling On The States In Perilous Times, Adam M. Giuliano

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The attacks of September 11 prompted a historic debate concerning terrorism and domestic emergency response. This ongoing dialogue has driven policy decisions touching upon both liberty and security concerns. Yet despite the enormous effort that has gone into the national response, the role of the sovereign states, and with it federalism, has received comparatively little attention. This Article explores the relevance of federalism within the context of the "War on Terror" and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Acknowledging that theories of federalism developed elsewhere are insufficient, he outlines a doctrine of 'emergency federalism.' The author argues that the Framers …

A Syllabus Of Errors, Douglas Laycock

Michigan Law Review

Modern American society is pervasively regulated. It is also religiously diverse to a degree that is probably unprecedented in the history of the world. It is inevitable that some of these diverse religious practices will violate some of these pervasive regulations, and equally inevitable that if we ask whether all these regulations are really necessary, sometimes the answer will be no. If we take free exercise of religion seriously, sometimes it will make sense to exempt sincere religious practices from generally applicable laws - but only some laws, and only some applications. Hardly anyone thinks that human sacrifice should be …

A Response To Professor Laycock, Marci A. Hamilton

Michigan Law Review

Almost a hundred years ago, the American Association of University Professors established guidelines for civility among scholars, saying that academic exchanges "should be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and temperateness of language." I agree wholeheartedly with these principles, and I will not succumb to the temptation to respond in kind to Professor Laycock's review. Tone is much less important than having a frank exchange of views. It is well known that Professor Laycock and I have very different perspectives on the proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. His review and my response should be an opportunity for us to …

Double-Consciousness In Constitutional Adjudication, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theorists are familiar with epistemic and consequentialist reasons why judges might allow their decision making to be shaped by strongly held public opinion. The epistemic approach treats public opinion as an expert indicator, while the consequentialistapproach counsels judges to compromise legally correct interpretations so as not to antagonize a hostile public. But there is also a third reason, which we can think ofas constitutive. In limited circumstances, the fact that the public strongly holds a given view can be one of the factors that together constitute the correct answer to a constitutional question. In those circumstances, what the public …

Vultures In Eagles' Clothing: Conspiracy And Racial Fantasy In Populist Legal Thought, Angela P. Harris

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article has three interrelated aims. First, I will briefly describe the online world of the legal populists. My second aim in this Article is to give an account of legal populism that connects it with the American tradition of conspiracy theory and with the political consciousness of survivalism. My third and final aim in this Article is to examine, as David Williams has done in a wonderful series of articles, the relationship between the nation dreamed of by many legal populists and the one inhabited by state-sanctioned legal insiders.

Comparative Constitutionalism In A New Key, Paul W. Kahn

Michigan Law Review

Law is a symbolic system that structures the political imagination. The "rule of law" is a shorthand expression for a cultural practice that constructs a particular understanding of time and space, of subjects and groups, as well as of authority and legitimacy. It is a way of projecting, maintaining, and discovering meaning in the world of historical events and political possibilities. The rule of law - as opposed to the techniques of lawyering - is not the possession of lawyers. It is a characterization of the polity, which operates both descriptively and normatively in public perception. Ours, we believe, is …

The Foundations Of Liberty, Lawrence B. Solum

Michigan Law Review

Randy Barnett's The Structure of Liberty is an ambitious book. The task that Barnett sets himself is to offer an original and persuasive argument for a libertarian political theory, a theory that challenges the legitimacy of the central institutions of the modern regulatory-welfare state. The Structure of Liberty is that rare creature, a book that delivers on most of the promises it makes. Already the book is on its way to becoming a contemporary classic, the successor in interest to Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia as a source of ideas and arguments for the revitalization of an important intellectual …

South Africa's Amnesty Process: A Viable Route Toward Truth And Reconciliation, Emily H. Mccarthy

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

The road to democracy for South Africa was based on compromise. One of the most significant compromises made by the negotiators was the acceptance of an amnesty process culminating in the passage of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. The Act grants full indemnity from criminal and civil prosecution to anyone affiliated with a political organization who committed an "act associated with a political objective" and who fully discloses all relevant facts. The purpose of the Act is twofold: to establish the "truth" about the apartheid past and to promote "reconciliation" among South Africans. Unfortunately, such …

Back To The Briarpatch: An Argument In Favor Of Constitutional Meta-Analysis In State Action Determinations, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Brer Rabbit, after claiming repeatedly that he would prefer almost anything to being thrown into the briarpatch, expressed glee once tossed there. In fact, Brer Rabbit wanted to be in the briarpatch because, like most rabbits, he could navigate the briarpatch with relative ease: the briarpatch was home.

Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed a great degree of familiarity with the state action doctrine, a doctrinal briar patch. Like Brer Rabbit, the Court has disclaimed repeatedly any interest in being there.

In this article, I argue that the existing tests for establishing the presence of …

Dialogue And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that most normative legal scholarship regarding the role of judicial review rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation. The goal of this article is to redescribe the landscape of American constitutionalism in a manner vastly different than most normative scholarship. At times this article slips across the line into prescription, but by and large the task is descriptive. The idea is to clear the way so that later normative work can proceed against the backdrop of a far more accurate understanding of the system of American constitutionalism.

This article proceeds in three separate parts. Parts I and II …

Justifiably Punishing The Justified, Heidi M. Hurd

Michigan Law Review

Contemporary moral philosophy, political theory, and jurisprudence have converged to create a quite baffling dilemma. This dilemma is generated by the apparent incompatibility of three principles, each of which grounds features of our system of law and government, and each of which carries substantial normative weight. The first I shall call the punishment principle - a moral principle, doctrinally entrenched in American criminal and civil law, which holds that individuals who are morally justified in their actions ought not to be blamed or punished for those actions. The second is the principle of the rule of law - a complex …

Foreign Affairs Law And Democracy, Phillip R. Trimble

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs by Louis Henkin

Population Changes And Constitutional Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, Peter Suber

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

To amend the federal Constitution, we need the assent of two-thirds of each house of Congress and three-fourths of the states. This Article focuses on the three-fourths requirement for the states. This threshold is particularly high, and it suggests that constitutional amendment is very difficult. In fact, amendment is difficult in different degrees for different constituencies, depending not on their numbers but on where they live.

Governmental Secrecy And The Founding Fathers: A Study In Constitutional Controls, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Governmental Secrecy and the Founding Fathers: A Study in Constitutional Controls by Daniel N. Hoffman

Making Campaign Finance Law Enforceable: Closing The Independent Expenditure Loophole, John P. Relman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note explores the problems posed by present attempts to define "coordination." Part I discusses generally the complexities of the coordination problem under Buckley, setting forth the rationale behind the Buckley rule and examining present efforts by Congress and the FEC to enforce the Buckley standards. Part I concludes by proposing a new definition for "coordination" designed to improve enforcement of the Buckley rule. Part II presents an alternative means for remedying the coordination problem. Rather than relying on a redefinition of coordination for proper enforcement of federal election law, this section proposes prophylactic legislation designed to regulate independent …

Constitutional Interpretation, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

"[We] must never forget," Chief Justice Marshall admonished us in a statement pregnant with more than one meaning, "that it is a constitution we are expounding."' Marshall meant that the Constitution should be read as a document "intended to endure for ages.to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."'2 But he meant also that the construction placed upon the document must have regard for its "great outlines" and "important objects."'3 Limits are implied by the very nature of the task. There is not the same freedom in construing the Constitution as in constructing a …

Congressional Control Of Agency Privilege, Mark A. Luscombe

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This note seeks to provide an introductory and largely historical analysis of "agency privilege:" the refusal of federal executive officials to furnish information and documents to congressional bodies absent the invocation of a claim of privilege by the President. After a brief survey of the origins of agency privilege in part I, the history and nature of the competing interests of congressional investigations and autonomy of executive departments and agencies will be discussed in part II. Part III explores the constitutional basis of the claim and analyzes other justifications proffered in specific circumstances. Part IV weighs the merits of various …

Immunity Under The Speech Or Debate Clause For Republican And From Questioning About Sources, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Gravel v. United States, which arose out of Senator Mike Gravel's attempt to publicize the Pentagon Papers, concerned the scope of the immunity conferred upon a legislator and his aide under article I, section 6, of the United States Constitution. This provision, commonly called the "speech or debate clause," provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [United States Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." Gravel is one of the few Supreme Court interpretations of this clause.

Judicial Supremacy Re-Examined: A Proposed Alternative, G. Sidney Buchanan

Michigan Law Review

A citizen critic recently expressed to me his bitter opposition to the Warren Court's decisions on school prayer and school desegregation. If this critic were elected governor of a state or placed in some other position of governmental authority, he would almost certainly use his power to block public school desegregation and to encourage prayer reading in the public schools. Conceding that our critic would be acting controversially in so using his power, would he be acting unconstitutionally? This is the question which this Article will attempt to answer. More generally, this Article will consider the extent to which a …

Territorial Courts And The Law: Unifying Factors In The Development Of American Legal Institutions-Pt.Ii-Influences Tending To Unify Territorial Law, William Wirt Blume, Elizabeth Gaspar Brown

Michigan Law Review

With the exception of Kentucky, Vermont, Texas, California, and West Virginia, all parts of continental United States south and west of the present boundaries of the original states came under colonial rule, and were governed from the national capital through territorial governments for varying periods of time. All territories in this area were "incorporated" in the sense that they were destined to become states of the United States. All became states by 1912, leaving only Alaska and Hawaii for future statehood. Now that these territories have become states, it seems desirable to review legal developments in all of these "incorporated" …

Territorial Courts And Law: Unifying Factors In The Development Of American Legal Institutions-Pt.1-Establishment Of A Standardized Judicial System, William Wirt Blume, Elizabeth Gaspar Brown

Michigan Law Review

The United States first became a sovereign nation when individual states of the Confederation ceded to the states collectively their several interests in the lands west of the Appalachians which lay east of the Mississippi, north of Spanish Florida, and south of the Great Lakes. This area had been relinquished by Great Britain by the Treaty of 1783 and, with the exception of Kentucky, now became the property of the United States. It was the first area over which the states as a group had complete sovereignty, subject only to the claims of the various Indian tribes. Colonies fresh from …