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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Rule of Law
Supervising Outsourcing: The Need For Better Design Of Blended Governance, Nina A. Mendelson
Supervising Outsourcing: The Need For Better Design Of Blended Governance, Nina A. Mendelson
Book Chapters
We are long past the “vending machine”-style privatization of government functions – where the government contracts to buy a discrete product or service at a set price, whether aircraft components or landscaping. Government is increasingly enlisting, or collaborating with, private entities for functions long perceived as distinctly public. Private entities may make policy explicitly (through standards that agencies later adopt) or implicitly (through the third party verification of compliance with regulatory objectives). For example, the Department of Health and Human Services relies on the recommendations of an American Medical Association committee of specialist physicians to establish Medicare physician payments, while …
The Emptiness Of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control Of The Administrative State, Cary Coglianese
The Emptiness Of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control Of The Administrative State, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
The heads of administrative agencies exercise authority delegated directly to them through legislation. To what extent, then, may presidents lawfully direct these agency heads to carry out presidential priorities? A prevailing view in administrative law holds that, although presidents may seek to shape and oversee the work of agency officials, they cannot make decisions for those officials. Yet this approach of imposing a decisional limit on presidential control of the administrative state in reality fails to provide any meaningful constraint on presidential power and actually risks exacerbating the politicization of constitutional law. A decisional limit presents these problems because the …