Religion Law Commons^™

Reclaiming Establishment: Identity And The ‘Religious Equality Problem’, Faraz Sanei

Faculty Scholarship

Since at least 2017, the Court has implicitly recognized a right of equal access to generally available public benefits based on the beneficiary's religious identity or status. In Carson v. Makin (2022), the Court went a step further and, for the first time, concluded that the “status-use distinction lacks a meaningful application” in both theory and practice. It then held that restrictions on the use of public benefits for sacral purposes amount to religious discrimination because they impose substantial burdens on free exercise rights. Carson's holding, and the rationale underlying it, contravene settled case law and effectively gut the Establishment …

Secular Invocations And The Promise Of Religious Pluralism, Jay D. Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of “legislative prayer” twice, once in the 1983 case of Marsh v. Chambers and once in the 2014 case of Town of Greece v. Galloway. Although both of those cases upheld challenged invocation practices on the basis that such practices predated the adoption of the First Amendment, they also placed additional limits on the nature of such prayer programs, including that they be non-discriminatory, as Justice Kennedy explained in Town of Greece. In response to Justice Kennedy’s non-discrimination mandate, hundreds of secular individuals in the wake of Town of Greece asked to give …

Religious Liberty For A Select Few, Sharita Gruberg, Frank J. Bewkes, Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Katherine M. Franke, Claire Markham

Faculty Scholarship

This report discusses how the Department of Justice’s guidance opens the door to an extreme rewriting of the concept of religious liberty. The guidance — and the numerous agency rules, enforcement actions, and policies that it is influencing — will shift the balance of individual religious protections across the federal government toward a new framing that allows religious beliefs to be used as a weapon against minority groups.

Press Definition And The Religion Analogy, Ronnell Andersen Jones

Faculty Scholarship

n a Harvard Law Review Forum response to Professor Sonja West's symposium article, "Press Exceptionalism," Professor RonNell Andersen Jones critiques Professor West's effort to define "the press" for purposes of Press Clause exceptions and addresses the weaknesses of Professor West's analogy to Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC in drawing these definitional lines. The response highlights distinctions between Press Clause and Religion Clause jurisprudence and urges a more functional approach to press definition.

Rfra Exemptions From The Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation Of Religion, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Rebecca G. Van Tassell

Faculty Scholarship

Litigation surrounding use of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to exempt employers from the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate” is moving steadily towards resolution in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both opponents and supporters of the mandate, however, have overlooked the Establishment Clause limits on such exemptions.

The heated religious-liberty rhetoric aimed at the mandate has obscured that RFRA is a “permissive” rather than “mandatory” accommodation of religion — a government concession to religious belief and practice that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Permissive accommodations must satisfy Establishment Clause constraints, notably the requirement that the accommodation not impose …

With Religious Liberty For All: A Defense Of The Affordable Care Act's Contraception Coverage Mandate, Frederick Mark Gedicks

Faculty Scholarship

The “contraception mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 poses a straightforward question for religious liberty jurisprudence: Must government excuse a believer from complying with a religiously burdensome law, when doing so would violate the liberty of others by imposing on them the costs and consequences of religious beliefs that they do not share? To ask this question is to answer it: One's religious liberty does not include the right to interfere with the liberty of others, and thus religious liberty may not be used by a religious employer to force employees to pay the costs …

Selling Land And Religion, Eang L. Ngov

Faculty Scholarship

Thousands of religious monuments have been donated to cities and towns. Under Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, local, state, and federal governments now have greater freedom to accept religious monuments, symbols, and objects donated to them for permanent display in public spaces without violating the Free Speech Clause. Now that governments may embrace religious monuments and symbols as their own speech, the obvious question arises whether governments violate the Establishment Clause by permanently displaying a religiously significant object. Fearing an Establishment Clause violation, some governmental bodies have privatized religious objects and the land beneath them by selling or transferring the …

Government Disapproval Of Religion, Jay D. Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s “Endorsement Test” for evaluating the constitutionality of government sponsored symbols, displays, and messages regarding religion is notoriously controversial and has engendered enormous scholarly attention. In addition to government “endorsement” of religion, however, the test also prohibits the government from sending a message of “disapproval” of religion. The disapproval side of the Endorsement Test has not been subject to almost any scholarly discussion, which is not surprising given that until recently the courts have had no reason to entertain, much less sustain, challenges to alleged government disapproval of religion. In the last few years, however, due to a …

In Celebration Of Steven Shiffrin's The Religious Left And Church-State Relations, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Steven Shiffrin's The Religious Left and Church-State Relations is a truly remarkable book in many respects. I shall briefly note a few of its striking features, including some illustrative passages, and outline a number of its central themes, before tackling what for me is its most challenging and perplexing set of theses – the relations between constitutional and political discourse, and between religious liberals, on the one hand, and religious conservatives and secular liberals on the other.

We might well think of this as two books in one: a book about the constitutional law of free exercise and non-establishment, and …

Secularism, Religion, And Liberal Democracy In The United States, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is divided into three categories: some brief remarks about forms of secularism, an outline of American constitutional law as it relates to religion, and a discussion from the standpoint of political philosophy of the proper place of religion (and other similar perspectives) in making political decisions within liberal democracies. Because the audience for whom the oral comments from which the essay is derived was mainly non-American, the middle part of the essay sets out many propositions familiar to anyone acquainted with this branch of constitutional law. And because of the informal nature of the original presentation, I offer …

Shifting Out Of Neutral: Intelligent Design And The Road To Nonpreferentialism, Kelly S. Terry

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Brief Comments On An Intermediate Position, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

I am going to start with some clarifications about how I see this topic. Some of what I say may be a bit repetitive, but I think it can be helpful. I do not see this subject as mainly about the force of the Establishment Clause. With Judge McConnell, I think there is a big difference between promoting a religious position, let's say, which I think teaching creationism is, and deciding some moral or political issue based on a religious judgment, such as whether there should be restrictive abortion law. And I do not think this is a question of …

Apparent Consistency Of Religion Clause Doctrine, The The Rehnquist Court And The First Amendment, Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

A hallmark of religion clause scholarship is the complaint that the doctrine is a hopeless muddle. However, the Rehnquist Court brought a considerable amount of consistency-well, apparent consistency- to the doctrine. I say "apparent consistency" because, just as a paradox is only a seeming contradiction, so was the Rehnquist Court's religion clause jurisprudence only seemingly consistent. The doctrine focuses on whether the government singles out religion for special benefit (generally problematic under the Establishment Clause) or for special burden (generally problematic under the Free Exercise Clause). If, on the other hand, the government benefits religion as part of a more …

Religion And The Rehnquist Court, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This summary Article pays predominant attention to what the Rehnquist Court has altered. It slights a significant range of continuity. That includes the Court's strong rejection of laws that discriminate among religions or that target religious practices and the Court's inhospitable response to religious exercises that are sponsored by public schools. Although "continuity" may be a misleading term for subjects a court has not addressed, the Supreme Court has not touched the law regarding judicial involvement in church property disputes since Rehnquist became Chief Justice, and nothing it has decided presages an obvious shift in that jurisprudence.

Originalism And The Religion Clauses: A Response To Professor George, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This response to Professor Robert George's thoughtful remarks tries to preserve the flavor of a brief rejoinder in a debate. I sketch differences with him over some major topics, but I do not develop these at length.

Religious Law And Civil Law: Using Secular Law To Assure Observance Of Practices With Religious Significance, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Civil law in the United States rarely helps to enforce religious standards or demands that people perform actions whose significance relates to religious obligations. Yet, some American states do have such involvement with certain observances of Orthodox and Conservative Judaism. Many states enforce kosher requirements, to which Orthodox and some Conservative Jews adhere. The laws, which penalize fraud in the labeling of products as kosher, serve the secular interest in preventing deception of consumers. However, the laws also force the state to decide when religious regulations have been violated.

Orthodox and Conservative Jewish divorces raise a second kind of involvement. …

Should The Religion Clauses Of The Constitution Be Amended?, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Our subject, whether the religion clauses of the federal constitution should be amended, goes to the heart of relations between government and the practice of religion in our society. These relations deeply affect the health of both religion and government. When public officials persecute some religions and embrace others, the risks are political tyranny and rigid, unthinking, unfeeling, vapid religion. No one wishes that fate for us.

When most people ask whether the religion clauses should be amended, they are really asking whether judicial interpretations have become so misguided that Congress and state legislatures should intervene and invoke the cumbersome …

Quo Vadis: The Status And Prospects Of Tests Under The Religion Clauses, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

As the 1994 term drew to a close, "tests" for the Religion Clauses were in nearly total disarray. Apart from cases of discrimination against religions, and disputes over church property, a student of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence could not formulate any general tests that a majority of the Justices clearly support. As exciting as this state of affairs is for those who welcome uncertainty and change, it is disquieting for lawyers and clients, for judges who must decide free exercise and establishment claims, and for Supreme Court Justices who aspire to stable principles of adjudication. In this essay, I provide …

The Political Balance Of The Religion Clauses, Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

When the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect religious practices from otherwise valid laws that incidentally burden those practices, it followed a particular theory of democratic politics. That some laws might unintentionally burden certain religious practices is, said the Court, an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government [that] must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself." The Court was certainly right in one sense: To claim that conscientious objection to an otherwise valid law should exempt one from that law is to claim that …