Religion Law Commons^™

How Does "Equal Liberty" Fare In Relation To Other Approaches To The Religion Clauses?, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

As one of four contributors to an issue celebrating Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager's Religious Freedom and the Constitution, I have chosen to write an Essay that differs from an ordinary review. I compare the authors' approach with two other recent formulations of what should be central for the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. Since I have recently published my own treatment of the Free Exercise Clause, and a second volume on the Establishment Clause is in the pipeline toward publication, I do not here present my own positive views (though I provide references for interested readers). Those views …

Establishment Clause Limits On Free Exercise Accommodations, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Among the most vexing questions in the law of the religion clauses is when a legal measure that might otherwise be justified as an accommodation to free exercise is instead a forbidden establishment of religion. In a book about free exercise, I have provided some idea just how complex this question can be. I now tackle it head on. Scholars have fairly observed that the Supreme Court has given us no theory, or no tenable theory, for drawing the line between permissible accommodation and impermissible establishment. We will look at what the Court has said and done, as well as …

Moral And Religious Convictions As Categories For Special Treatment: The Exemption Strategy, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

My topic differs from the usual inquiries about morality and law, such as how far law should embody morality, whether legal interpretation (always or sometimes) includes moral judgment, and whether an immoral law really counts as law. Concentrating on exemptions from ordinary legal requirements, I am interested in instances when the law might make especially relevant the moral judgments of individual actors. I am particularly interested in whether the law should ever treat moral judgments based on religious conviction differently from moral judgments that lack such a basis.

A striking example for both questions is conscientious objection to military service. …