Religion Law Commons^™

Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth Clark

Faculty Scholarship

Commentators increasingly challenge religion’s privileged legal status, arguing that it is not “special” or distinct from other associations or philosophical or conscientious claims. I propose that religion is “special” because it functions metaphorically as a legal sovereign, asserting supreme authority over a realm of human life. Under a religion-as-sovereign theory, religious freedom can be understood as at least partial deference to a religious sovereign in a system of shared or overlapping sovereignty. This Article suggests that federalism, which also involves shared sovereignty, can provide a useful heuristic device for examining religious freedom. Specifically, the Article examines a range of federalism …

Religions As Sovereigns: Why Religion Is "Special", Elizabeth A. Clark

Elizabeth A. Clark

Religion And First Amendment Prosecutions: An Analysis Of Justice Black's Constitutional Interpretation, Constance Mauney

Pepperdine Law Review

Justice Hugo L. Black served on the United States Supreme Court over a period of thirty-four years, encompassing Supreme Court terms from 1937 to 1971. During this period, the subject of the constitutional limitations of the freedom of religion was increasingly subjected to intense social pressures. Justice Black figured prominently in the development of constitutional law as the Supreme Court attempted to give meaning to the establishment and free exercise clause of the first amendment. He wrote the majority opinions which dealt with the establishment clause in the Everson, McCulloin, Engel and Torcaso cases. Yet, on later occasions, Justice Black …

Brief For Prof. Leslie C. Griffin As Amica Curiae In Support Of Appellant, Kant V. Lexington Theological Seminary, Leslie C. Griffin

Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.