Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Public Law and Legal Theory
Public Interest Litigation & Women’S Rights: Cases From Nepal & India, Jordan E. Stevenson
Public Interest Litigation & Women’S Rights: Cases From Nepal & India, Jordan E. Stevenson
2019 Symposium
As a complex, diverse and dynamic region with diverging, constantly changing constitutional and jurisprudential contexts as well as lasting legacies of patriarchy, South Asia’s traditions of public interest litigation are one of the most well-studied institutions by Western audiences due to their contradictory progressive and innovative nature. Particularly in India, where public interest litigation gives ordinary citizens extraordinary access to the highest courts of justice, questions have been raised as to the effectiveness of public interest litigation as a tool to address gender disparities across the region. Although Supreme Court justices have been a key ally in eliminating legal barriers …
Private Property, Development And Freedom, Steven J. Eagle
Private Property, Development And Freedom, Steven J. Eagle
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
The author asserts that adherence to the rule of law, including property law, is a necessary condition to economic development and human freedom. United States governmental agencies and private institutes have attempted to convey this message to Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and former Soviet satellite states, with some success. Finally, and unfortunately, the United States has veered away from the very adherence to the rule of law respecting property which it espouses abroad.
The Paradox Of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, And Commitments, David S. Law
The Paradox Of Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, And Commitments, David S. Law
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
Sovereigns, like individuals, must sometimes make commitments that limit their own freedom of action in order to accomplish their goals. Social scientists have observed that constitutional arrangements can, by restricting a sovereign's power, enable the sovereign to make such commitments. This paper advances several claims about the commitment problems that sovereigns face. First, constitutions do not necessarily solve such problems but can instead aggravate them, by entrenching inalienable governmental powers and immunities. Second, sovereigns and other actors face two distinct varieties of commitment problems - undercommitment and overcommitment - between which they must steer: an actor that can bind itself …