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Minority Vetoes In Consociational Legislatures: Ultimately Weaponized?, Devin Haymond

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?

A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring …

Judicial Independence And The Budget: A Taxonomy Of Judicial Budgeting Mechanisms, Alexander Rosselli

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

This Paper addresses three aspects of judicial budgeting. First, it will identify the four broad families of constitutional provisions that consider the judicial budget. While the majority of procedures and requirements that govern judicial budgeting are found in statues, many nations’ constitutions explicitly address judicial salaries. Other constitutions only broadly address judicial budgeting. Second, we will analyze different approaches to judicial councils. Third, this Paper will address several different approaches to the judicial budgeting process. This includes how the judiciary’s budget is proposed, as well as how it is allocated and managed. Finally, this Paper will touch upon the tension …