Property Law and Real Estate Commons^™

Redefining The Injury-In-Fact: Treating Personally Identifying Information As Bailed Property, Austin Headrick

Georgia Law Review

There is a long-existing circuit split among federal courts of appeals as to whether an individual has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution when their personally identifying information (PII) is stolen from an entity to which they entrusted it such as a hospital or bank. Federal courts disagree as to whether an individual whose PII has been stolen—without more—has suffered an injury-in-fact, a necessary element of standing. The disagreement between the courts centers on whether the injury-in-fact has already occurred at the time the PII is stolen or whether the injury occurs once the PII has been …

Inadequate Privacy: The Necessity Of Hipaa Reform In A Post-Dobbs World, Katherine Robertson

Seattle University Law Review

Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of HIPAA and the legal impacts of Dobbs. Part II will discuss the anticipatory response to the impacts of Dobbs on PHI by addressing the response from (1) the states, (2) the Biden Administration, and (3) the medical field. Part III will discuss the loopholes that exist in HIPAA and further address the potential impacts on individuals and the medical field if reform does not occur. Finally, Part IV will argue that the reform of HIPAA is the best avenue for protecting PHI related to reproductive healthcare.

Escaping Circularity: The Fourth Amendment And Property Law, João Marinotti

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The Supreme Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test under the Fourth Amendment has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable. The Court is presumed to base its decisions on society’s expectations of privacy, while society’s expectations of privacy are themselves presumed to be based on the Court’s judgements. As a solution to this problem, property law has been repeatedly propounded as an allegedly independent, autonomous area of law from which the Supreme Court can glean reasonable expectations of privacy without falling back into tautological reasoning.

Such an approach presupposes that property law is not itself circular. If …

Private Largess In The Digital Age: Privacy In Reich's The New Property, Raymond H. Brescia

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Law Of The Tetrapods, Henry T. Greely

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Should there be such a thing as "Technology Law"? This Article explores that question in two ways. It first looks at four substantive issues that appear across many different areas of technology law: privacy, security, property, and responsibility. It then examines five questions that frequently recur about how to regulate very different new technologies. These questions include which agency should regulate, whether regulation should focus on before or after marketing, what jurisdiction should regulate, how relevant new information will be gained and used, and how-politically-good regulation can be enacted. This Article concludes that it may make sense to develop a …

Zoning For Families, Sara C. Bronin

Indiana Law Journal

Is a group of eight unrelated adults and three children living together and sharing meals, household expenses, and responsibilities—and holding themselves out to the world to have long-term commitments to each other—a family? Not according to most zoning codes—including that of Hartford, Connecticut, where the preceding scenario presented itself a few years ago. Zoning, which is the local regulation of land use, almost always defines family, limiting those who may live in a dwelling unit to those who satisfy the zoning code’s definition. Often times, this definition is drafted in a way that excludes many modern living arrangements and preferences. …

Drone Invasion: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles And The Right To Privacy, Rebecca L. Scharf

Indiana Law Journal

Since the birth of the concept of a legally recognized right to privacy in Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’ influential 1890 law review article, “The Right to Privacy,” common law—with the aid of influential scholars—has massaged the concept of privacy torts into actionable claims. But now, one of the most innovative technological advancements in recent years, the unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, has created difficult challenges for plaintiffs and courts navigating common law privacy tort claims.

This Article explores the challenges of prosecution of the specific privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion involving nongovernmental use of drone technology. …

Keep Out! The Efficacy Of Trespass, Nuisance And Privacy Torts As Applied To Drones, Hillary B. Farber

Georgia State University Law Review

A few years ago one might have seen a small object flying overhead without any idea what it could be. Today, it is fairly commonplace to see drones flying around our neighborhood skies. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts there will be seven million drones populating our skies by 2020. In 2015 hobbyists, recreational users, and commercial businesses purchased unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as drones, in record-breaking numbers. Estimates reveal that over 4.3 million drones were sold worldwide in 2015. Trade industry experts predicted that more than 2.8 million drones would be sold in the U.S. in 2016 …

Testimony On Unmanned Aircraft Systems Rules And Regulations, Stephen E. Henderson

Stephen E Henderson

The Inalienable Right Of Publicity, Jennifer E. Rothman

All Faculty Scholarship

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that the right of publicity is universally and uncontroversially alienable. Courts and scholars have routinely described the right as a freely transferable property right, akin to patents or copyrights. Despite such broad claims of unfettered alienability, courts have limited the transferability of publicity rights in a variety of instances. No one has developed a robust account of why such limits should exist or what their contours should be. This article remedies this omission and concludes that the right of publicity must have significantly limited alienability to protect the rights of individuals to control the …