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Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department

Election Law And The Presidency: An Introduction And Overview, Jerry H. Goldfeder Dec 2016

Election Law And The Presidency: An Introduction And Overview, Jerry H. Goldfeder

Fordham Law Review

Americans now fully appreciate that presidential candidates are vying for a majority of the Electoral College votes, rather than the individual votes of constituents. Modern campaigns are organized around this goal, and commentators are focused on this reality. As a result, there has been an increased cry to reform the electoral process. After all, if every other public official in the land is elected by receiving more votes than their competitors, why should the President of the United States be elected in this apparently undemocratic fashion? The process appears even more unusual in that electors are chosen pursuant to state …


Ramshackle Federalism: America’S Archaic And Dysfunctional Presidential Election System, Anthony J. Gaughan Dec 2016

Ramshackle Federalism: America’S Archaic And Dysfunctional Presidential Election System, Anthony J. Gaughan

Fordham Law Review

Accordingly, this Article proposes five sensible and achievable reforms to modernize the presidential election system. Each requires Congress and the federal government to play a much more proactive role in the presidential election system. The Constitution may be founded on federalist principles, but excessive decentralization is not serving us well in presidential election administration. In an age of tumultuous and accelerating change, the presidential election system must be modernized to meet the needs of twenty-first century America.


Rethinking Presidential Eligibility, Eugene D. Mazo Dec 2016

Rethinking Presidential Eligibility, Eugene D. Mazo

Fordham Law Review

Many aspiring American Presidents have had their candidacies challenged for failing to meet the Constitution’s eligibility requirements. Although none of these challenges have ever been successful, they have sapped campaigns of valuable resources and posed a threat to several ambitious men. This Article examines several notable presidential eligibility challenges and explains why they have often been unsuccessful. The literature on presidential eligibility traditionally has focused on the Eligibility Clause, which enumerates the age, residency, and citizenship requirements that a President must satisfy before taking office. By contrast, very little of it examines how a challenge to one’s candidacy impacts a …


Reforming The Contested Convention: Rethinking The Presidential Nomination Process, Michael T. Morley Dec 2016

Reforming The Contested Convention: Rethinking The Presidential Nomination Process, Michael T. Morley

Fordham Law Review

The presidential nomination process could be substantially improved through a few minor tweaks that would reduce unnecessary uncertainty, bolster its democratic underpinnings, and improve the connections among its various components. First, certain fundamental rules governing national conventions should be determined well in advance of the presidential nominating process, before any primaries or caucuses are held or delegates selected, and not be subject to change or suspension at the convention itself. Second, parties should enhance the democratic moorings of their national conventions by requiring presidential candidates to win a greater number of presidential preference votes to be placed into nomination. Third, …


“Natural Born” Disputes In The 2016 Presidential Election, Derek T. Muller Dec 2016

“Natural Born” Disputes In The 2016 Presidential Election, Derek T. Muller

Fordham Law Review

The 2016 presidential election brought forth new disputes concerning the definition of “natural born Citizen.” The most significant challenges surrounded the eligibility of Senator Ted Cruz, born in Canada to a Cuban father and an American mother. Unlike challenges to President Barack Obama’s eligibility, which largely turned on conspiratorial facts, challenges to Cruz’s eligibility turned principally on the law and garnered more serious attention concerning a somewhat cryptic constitutional clause. Understandably, much attention focused on the definition of “natural born citizen” and whether candidates like Cruz qualified. Administrative challenges and litigation in court revealed deficiencies in the procedures for handling …


Time To End Presidential Caucuses, Sean J. Wright Dec 2016

Time To End Presidential Caucuses, Sean J. Wright

Fordham Law Review

Following the 2016 election cycle, there will be a great opportunity to implement reform. A major change should be to move away from presidential caucuses. They persist with, in the words of John Oliver, “complex, opaque rules.” These complex rules, which include participating in person for over an hour, negatively impacts participation in the electoral process. For example, in 2012, “participation rates in the Republican Party’s caucuses averaged 3 percent.” 3 percent. Compellingly, PolitiFact has observed that “[c]aucuses and delegate math can be incredibly confusing, and the arcane party structures don’t reflect how most people assume presidential selection works.” Yet, …


Third-Party And Independent Presidential Candidates: The Need For A Runoff Mechanism, Edward B. Foley Dec 2016

Third-Party And Independent Presidential Candidates: The Need For A Runoff Mechanism, Edward B. Foley

Fordham Law Review

Consider what 2016 might have looked like if this better electoral system had been in place. Bloomberg then could have entered the race without risking being a spoiler. In a three-way race—Bloomberg, Clinton, and Trump—Bloomberg might have fizzled out, leaving a two-way race between Clinton and Trump. Since that is essentially how the election ended up anyway, the country would have been no worse off for having had a chance to consider Bloomberg as an alternative. But suppose, however, with Trump’s candidacy spinning out of control in a series of unacceptable comments (as it appeared to do in early August),11 …


Does The Constitution Provide More Ballot Access Protection For Presidential Elections Than For U.S. House Elections?, Richard Winger Dec 2016

Does The Constitution Provide More Ballot Access Protection For Presidential Elections Than For U.S. House Elections?, Richard Winger

Fordham Law Review

Both the U.S. Constitution and The Federalist Papers suggest that voters ought to have more freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice for the U.S. House of Representatives than they do for the President or the U.S. Senate. Yet, strangely, for the last thirty-three years, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have ruled that the Constitution gives voters more freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice in presidential elections than in congressional elections. Also, state legislatures, which have been writing ballot access laws since 1888, have passed laws that make it easier for minor-party and …


Administrative Law: The U.S. And Beyond, Cary Coglianese Jul 2016

Administrative Law: The U.S. And Beyond, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

Administrative law constrains and directs the behavior of officials in the many governmental bodies responsible for implementing legislation and handling governance responsibilities on a daily basis. This field of law consists of procedures for decision making by these administrative bodies, including rules about transparency and public participation. It also encompasses oversight practices provided by legislatures, courts, and elected executives. The way that administrative law affects the behavior of government officials holds important implications for the fulfillment of democratic principles as well as effective governance in society. This paper highlights salient political theory and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative …


The Bounds Of Executive Discretion In The Regulatory State, Cary Coglianese, Christopher S. Yoo Jun 2016

The Bounds Of Executive Discretion In The Regulatory State, Cary Coglianese, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

What are the proper bounds of executive discretion in the regulatory state, especially over administrative decisions not to take enforcement actions? This question, which, just by asking it, would seem to cast into some doubt the seemingly absolute discretion the executive branch has until now been thought to possess, has become the focal point of the latest debate to emerge over the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers. That ever‐growing, heated debate is what motivated more than two dozen distinguished scholars to gather for a two‐day conference held late last year at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, a conference organized …


Some Structural Dilemmas Of World Organization, C. Wilfred Jenks May 2016

Some Structural Dilemmas Of World Organization, C. Wilfred Jenks

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


The Curious Case Of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, Monu Bedi Feb 2016

The Curious Case Of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, Monu Bedi

Northwestern University Law Review

Police surveillance ability and information gathering capacity have a dynamic relationship with technology. Greater advancements in technology make it easier for the police to surveil individuals and collect information. This state of affairs leads to heightened concerns over Fourth Amendment protection. This issue has most recently played out in the context of police collecting cell phone location data. Courts disagree on whether and to what extent this data garners Fourth Amendment protection. Underlying this disagreement rests a hitherto overlooked tension between two interrelated Fourth Amendment doctrines—the third-party and the public disclosure doctrines. While both vitiate privacy protection and are commonly …


Confronting Power In Public Law, Kate Andrias Jan 2016

Confronting Power In Public Law, Kate Andrias

Articles

In his important and provocative Foreword, Professor Daryl Levinson criticizes American constitutional law for failing to attend sufficiently to questions of power, which he defines as “the ability to effect substantive policy outcomes by influencing what the government will or will not do.” As Levinson details, structural constitutional law has focused on how power is distributed among governmental institutions. It has not consistently or adequately considered how power is — or should be — distributed among social groups. Ultimately, Levinson suggests that the narrow focus of separation of powers law and theory on “equalizing the power of government institutions” lacks …


The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters Jan 2016

The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …


Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters Jan 2016

Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but they have received remarkably little attention by either administrative law scholars or social scientists who study the bureaucracy. Existing research offers few insights about the institutions, norms, and inputs that shape and constrain agency discretion over their agendas or about the strategies that officials employ in choosing to elevate certain issues while putting others on the back burner. In this article, we advance the study of …


Separation Of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry Into Norms About Executive Power, Cary Coglianese, Kristin Firth Jan 2016

Separation Of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry Into Norms About Executive Power, Cary Coglianese, Kristin Firth

All Faculty Scholarship

The continuing debate over the President’s directive authority is but one of the many separation-of-powers issues that have confronted courts, scholars, government officials, and the public in recent years. The Supreme Court, for instance, has considered whether the President possesses the power to make appointments of agency heads without Senate confirmation during certain congressional recesses. The Court has passed judgment recently, but has yet to resolve fully, questions about Congress’s authority to constrain the President’s power to remove the heads of administrative agencies. And the Court has considered the limits on Congress’s ability to delegate legislative authority to other rulemaking …


Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2016

Presidential Signing Statements: A New Perspective, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers a new perspective on Presidents’ use of signing statements. Following the dichotomy reflected in the literature, I will analyze signing statements raising constitutional objections and those offering interpretive guidance for ambiguous provisions separately. With respect to constitutional interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, Presidents have long asserted the authority and obligation to consider constitutionality when executing statutes. The widespread acceptance of the President’s power to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems and to refuse to defend the constitutionality of or to enforce statutes in appropriate cases confirms the propriety of this conclusion. If these fairly uncontroversial …