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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department
Lobue V. Christopher: Age-Old Separation Of Powers Debate Rages On As Court Rules Extradition Statute Unconstitutional, Joseph G. Silver
Lobue V. Christopher: Age-Old Separation Of Powers Debate Rages On As Court Rules Extradition Statute Unconstitutional, Joseph G. Silver
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers And Unilateral Executive Action: The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Mexican Loan Initiative, Kimberly D. Chapman
Separation Of Powers And Unilateral Executive Action: The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Mexican Loan Initiative, Kimberly D. Chapman
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla
Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent Barnett
Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent Barnett
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to satisfy impartiality …
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Michigan Law Review
Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to expand the role of the federal government-—maybe it was civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second president pushes policies—-financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug decriminalization—-that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals. The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances-—from …
Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson
Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson
Michigan Law Review
In both constitutional and international law, many legal rules cannot be implemented without what most people would describe as the voluntary compliance of their target. Is that really “law”? Or is rule compliance in such circumstances just an expression of “interests”? Forget jurisprudence for the moment. As a practical matter, what does it mean to work as a lawyer in a field where the rules are not coercively enforced against private parties by an independent judiciary whose orders are implemented by a cooperative executive? This question has particularly high stakes for national security policy, where we find judicial deference at …
Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof
Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof
Michigan Law Review
The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …
The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker
The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley
Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley
Faculty Scholarship
The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time through political-branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance. Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how historical practice can inform constitutional understandings …
The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff
The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …