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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department
The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia
The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …
In Defense Of The Post-Partisan President: Toward The Boundary Between "Partisan" Advantage And "Political" Choice, David C. Weiss
In Defense Of The Post-Partisan President: Toward The Boundary Between "Partisan" Advantage And "Political" Choice, David C. Weiss
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
No abstract provided.
Presidential Control Of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law Or Politics?, Cary Coglianese
Presidential Control Of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law Or Politics?, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
Recent controversy over the unitary executive may be part of what Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have called the “oldest debate in constitutional law.” Yet in this essay, I ask whether this debate is as much legal as it is political. Focusing on the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to grant California a waiver from national automobile emissions standards, I contrast the divergent reactions to presidential influence under President Bush and President Obama. In both administrations the EPA faced clear presidential pressure, but critics of President Bush’s involvement generally applauded the actions taken by President Obama. The main difference appears to …
Constitutional Expectations, Richard A. Primus
Constitutional Expectations, Richard A. Primus
Articles
The inauguration of Barack Obama was marred by one of the smallest constitutional crises in American history. As we all remember, the President did not quite recite his oath as it appears in the Constitution. The error bothered enough people that the White House redid the ceremony a day later, taking care to get the constitutional text exactly right. Or that, at least, is what everyone thinks happened. What actually happened is more interesting. The second time through, the President again departed from the Constitution's text. But the second time, nobody minded. Or even noticed. In that unremarked feature of …
Climate Change And Institutional Competence, Mark Squillace
Climate Change And Institutional Competence, Mark Squillace
Publications
No abstract provided.
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Scholars and courts have divided views on whether presidential supervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For some, that the President can supervise administrative agencies is key to seeing agency action as legitimate, because of the President's accountability to the electorate. Others, however, have argued that such supervision may simply taint, rather than legitimate, an agency action. The reality is that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking, at least, appears to be both significant and opaque. This Article presents evidence from multiple presidential administrations suggesting that regulatory review conducted by the White House's Office of Management and Budget is associated …
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.