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Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department

The Failed Transparency Regime For Executive Agreements: An Empirical And Normative Analysis, Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith Jan 2020

The Failed Transparency Regime For Executive Agreements: An Empirical And Normative Analysis, Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution specifies only one process for making international agreements. Article II states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” The treaty process has long been on a path to obsolescence, however, with fewer and fewer treaties being made in each presidential administration. Nevertheless, the United States has not stopped making international agreements. Even as Article II treaties have come to a near halt, the United States has concluded hundreds of binding international agreements each year. These agreements, known as …


Presidential Use Of Force In East Asia: American Constitutional Law And The U.S.-Japan Alliance, Matthew C. Waxman Jan 2020

Presidential Use Of Force In East Asia: American Constitutional Law And The U.S.-Japan Alliance, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution’s allocation of military authority has adapted over time to major shifts in American power and grand strategy. This paper explains, with a focus on U.S. military actions in East Asia and possible scenarios of special joint concern to the United States and Japan, that the president in practice wields tremendous power and discretion in using military force. Although formal, legal checks on the president’s use of force rarely come into play, Congress nevertheless retains some political power to influence presidential decision-making. The president’s powers are also constrained by interagency processes within the executive branch, and alliance relations …


War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman Jan 2020

War Powers: Congress, The President, And The Courts – A Model Casebook Section, Stephen M. Griffin, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

This model casebook section is concerned with the constitutional law of war powers as developed by the executive and legislative branches, with a limited look at relevant statutes and federal court cases. It is intended for use in Constitutional Law I classes that cover separation of powers. It could also be used for courses in National Security Law or Foreign Relations Law, or for graduate courses in U.S. foreign policy. This is designed to be the reading for one to two classes, and it can supplement or replace standard casebook sections on war powers that are shorter and offer less …


Congressional Administration Of Foreign Affairs, Rebecca Ingber Sep 2019

Congressional Administration Of Foreign Affairs, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not …


Presidential Control Over International Law, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith Jan 2018

Presidential Control Over International Law, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

Presidents have come to dominate the making, interpretation, and termination of international law for the United States. Often without specific congressional concurrence, and sometimes even when it is likely that Congress would disagree, the President has developed the authority to:

(a) make a vast array of international obligations for the United States, through both written agreements and the development of customary international law;

(b) make increasingly consequential political commitments for the United States on practically any topic;

(c) interpret these obligations and commitments; and

(d) terminate or withdraw from these obligations and commitments.

While others have examined pieces of this …


Obama's Aumf Legacy, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack Landman Goldsmith Jan 2016

Obama's Aumf Legacy, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack Landman Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2014

Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time through political-branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance. Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how historical practice can inform constitutional understandings …


Of Civil Wrongs And Rights: Kiyemba V. Obama And The Meaning Of Freedom, Separation Of Powers, And The Rule Of Law Ten Years After 9/11, Katherine L. Vaughns, Heather L. Williams Jan 2013

Of Civil Wrongs And Rights: Kiyemba V. Obama And The Meaning Of Freedom, Separation Of Powers, And The Rule Of Law Ten Years After 9/11, Katherine L. Vaughns, Heather L. Williams

Faculty Scholarship

This article is about the rise and fall of continued adherence to the rule of law, proper application of the separation of powers doctrine, and the meaning of freedom for a group of seventeen Uighurs—a Turkic Muslim ethnic minority whose members reside in the Xinjiang province of China—who had been held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base since 2002. Most scholars regard the trilogy of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush as demonstrating the Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold the rule of law during the war on terror. The recent experience of the Uighurs …


M.B.Z. V. Clinton: Whither Jerusalem?, Calvin R. Massey Jan 2011

M.B.Z. V. Clinton: Whither Jerusalem?, Calvin R. Massey

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Scope Of Executive Power In The Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, Robert D. Sloane Jan 2008

The Scope Of Executive Power In The Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, Robert D. Sloane

Faculty Scholarship

This is a revised version of introductory remarks to a panel entitled The Scope of Executive Power held on October 12, 2007, at Boston University Law School's symposium, The Role of the President in the 21st Century. It focuses on an argument advanced by Charlie Savage, among others: that the Bush administration has forged a breathtakingly robust view of the scope of executive power by combining (1) the original Unitary Executive thesis, which insists on the "exclusivity" of certain plenary presidential powers; with (2) a new Unitary Executive thesis, which insists on a vastly expanded vision of the "scope" of …


The Judicial Power And Treaty Delegation, Michael P. Van Alstine Jan 2002

The Judicial Power And Treaty Delegation, Michael P. Van Alstine

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Presidential War-Making, Henry Paul Monaghan Jan 1970

Presidential War-Making, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

The Vietnam "war" has convinced many persons that the president of the United States claims apparently unlimited power to commit this country to war. Not surprisingly, therefore, considerable interest has focused on the powers that inhere in the presidency. And many critics of the war – those who in other times and in other contexts might have been sympathetic to a spacious conception of presidential power – have concluded that the Vietnam conflict is not only a tragic error, but is the direct result of unconstitutional conduct by the president. I cannot accept this view; at bottom, it seems to …