Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
President/Executive Department Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- Federal government (2)
- Administration (1)
- Biden (1)
- Bipartisan (1)
- Civil Service (1)
-
- Civil service (1)
- Constitution (1)
- Constitutional law (1)
- Cross party collaboration (1)
- Direct election (1)
- Donald Trump (1)
- Electoral college (1)
- Government (1)
- Law (1)
- Policy sciences (1)
- Political participation (1)
- Political science (1)
- Politics (1)
- Politics and government (1)
- President (1)
- Presidents--Election (1)
- Presidents—Election (1)
- Public expenditures (1)
- SSRN (1)
- Suffrage (1)
- Transition (1)
- Trump (1)
- United States. Congress (1)
- Vetos (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department
Power Transitions In A Troubled Democracy, Peter L. Strauss, Gillian E. Metzger
Power Transitions In A Troubled Democracy, Peter L. Strauss, Gillian E. Metzger
Faculty Scholarship
Written as our contribution to a festschrift for the noted Italian administrative law scholar Marco D’Alberti, this essay addresses transition between Presidents Trump and Biden, in the context of political power transitions in the United States more generally. Although the Trump-Biden transition was marked by extraordinary behaviors and events, we thought even the transition’s mundane elements might prove interesting to those for whom transitions occur in a parliamentary context. There, succession can happen quickly once an election’s results are known, and happens with the new political government immediately formed and in office. The layer of a new administration’s political leadership …
Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, And President Donald Trump, Neil S. Siegel
Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, And President Donald Trump, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
This symposium Essay argues that what is most troubling about the conduct of President Trump during and since the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign is not any potential violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal law. There likely have been some such violations, and there may be more. But what is most troubling about President Trump is his disregard of political norms that had previously constrained presidential candidates and Presidents, and his flouting of nonlegal but obligatory “constitutional conventions” that had previously guided and disciplined occupants of the White House. These norms and conventions, although not “in” the Constitution, play a …
Elections, Ideology, And Turnover In The U.S. Federal Government, Alexander D. Bolton, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Elections, Ideology, And Turnover In The U.S. Federal Government, Alexander D. Bolton, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, we know little about how elections influence public sector careers. We describe how elections alter policy outputs and disrupt the influence of civil servants over agency decisions. These changes shape the career choices of employees motivated by policy, influence, and wages. Using new Office of Personnel Management data on the careers of millions of federal employees between 1988 and 2011, we evaluate how elections influence employee turnover decisions. We find that presidential elections increase departure rates of career senior employees, particularly in agencies with divergent …
The Electoral College, The Right To Vote, And Our Federalism: A Comment On A Lasting Institution, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Guy-Uriel Charles
The Electoral College, The Right To Vote, And Our Federalism: A Comment On A Lasting Institution, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Guy-Uriel Charles
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations on the veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure …