President/Executive Department Commons^™

David Versus Godzilla: Bigger Stones, Jerry Ellig, Richard Williams

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

For four decades, U.S. Presidents have issued executive orders requiring agencies to conduct comprehensive regulatory impact analysis (RIA) for significant regulations to ensure that regulatory decisions solve social problems in a cost-beneficial manner. Yet experience demonstrates that agency RIAs often fail to live up to the standards enunciated in executive orders and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) oversees agency compliance with the executive orders, but OIRA is about half the size it was when it was established in 1980. Regulatory agency staff outnumber OIRA staff by a ratio of 3600 …

How Much Procedure Is Needed For Agencies To Change “Novel” Regulatory Policies?, Ming Hsu Chen

Publications

The use of guidance documents in administrative law has long been controversial and considered to be one of the most challenging aspects of administrative law. When an agency uses a guidance document to change or make policy, it need not provide notice to the public or allow comment on the new rule; this makes changes easier and faster and less subject to judicial review. Under the Obama Administration, guidance documents were used to implement policy shifts in many areas of administrative law, including civil rights issues such as transgender inclusion and campus sexual harassment and immigration law issues such as …

Environmental Health Regulation In The Trump Era: How President Trump’S Two-For-One Regulatory Plan Impacts Environmental Regulation, Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article explores the Trump regulatory reform agenda and its potential impact on environmental determinants of health. The Article begins with a discussion of the Department of Commerce’s (DOC or Commerce) initial fact-finding investigation to evaluate the impact of federal regulations on domestic manufacturing. The Article next presents an overview of the Trump administration’s regulatory reform formula as announced in E.O. 13771 and the interim guidance explaining E.O. 13771 and E.O. 13777 (the executive order announcing the Trump administration’s plans to enforce the regulatory reform plan announced in E.O. 13771). The Article then examines the federal agency initiatives undertaken in …

Improving Regulatory Analysis At Independent Agencies, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

Each year, independent regulatory agencies—such as the Federal Communications Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission—issue highly consequential regulations. When they issue their regulations, however, they do not have to meet the same requirements for analysis that apply to other agencies. Consequently, courts, policymakers, and scholars have voiced serious reservations about a general lack of high-quality prospective analysis of new regulations at independent agencies. These agencies’ track records with retrospective analysis of their existing regulations raise similar concerns. In this article, I approach the quality of regulatory analysis at independent agencies as a policy problem, assessing the current …

Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

For hundreds of years prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Anglo-American legislatures used qui tam legislation to enforce legal constraints on government officials. A qui tam statute allows a private informer to collect a statutory fine for illegal conduct, even if the informer lacks the particularized injury normally required for Article III standing. This essay explores whether qui tam regulation should be revived as a means of ensuring executive branch legal accountability."

Presidential Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

"The biggest problem that we're facing right now has to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all, and that's what I intend to reverse when I'm president of the United States of America."

"Why is @BarackObama constantly issuing executive orders that are major power grabs of authority?"

"President Trump signed the 30th executive order of his presidency on Friday, capping off a whirlwind period that produced more orders in his first 100 days than for any president since Harry Truman. The rash of executive orders …

The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

Exploring Alternatives To The "Consultation Or Consent" Paradigm, Jason Searle

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

The Dakota Access Pipeline brought the question of what adequate tribal consultation requires to the forefront. Some would argue that consultation is a weak standard and that only adopting a new standard of free, prior, and informed consent can guarantee tribes greater control and respect. However, the “consultation or consent” paradigm does not take into account important sources of law that do not fit under “consultation” or “consent” and yet could be valuable in strengthening tribes’ claims in the absence of a consent standard.

Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope …

Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last ninety days of presidential administrations when the President is a lame duck, having either been defeated in a bid for re-election or being at the end of the second term in office. This includes an increase in the number of final rules issued as compared to other periods. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “midnight regulation,” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Article looks closely at one species of …

Slides: Indian Water Rights, Robert T. Anderson

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Robert T. Anderson, Native American Law Center, University of Washington Law School

19 slides

Beyond The Limits Of Executive Power: Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, Morton Rosenberg

Michigan Law Review

This Article addresses the substantial legal problems posed by Executive Order 12,291. Part I argues that the Order, taken as a whole or separated into its procedural and substantive components, violates the constitutional separation of powers. Drawing on the analytic framework outlined by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case, Part I maintains that courts should demand clear congressional support for the Order's requirements. The available evidence, however, conclusively demonstrates Congress's intent to deny the President formalized, substantive control over administrative policymaking. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, moreover, the informal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) …