National Security Law Commons^™

Indefinite Material Witness Detention Without Probable Cause: Thinking Outside The Fourth Amendment, Michael Greenberger

Michael Greenberger

A constitutional issue recently addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2003), has not received the widespread attention of high-profile litigation concerning the Justice Department's other controversial counter-terrorism policies. It is equally important. The issue arises out of Attorney General Ashcroft's announcement shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that the aggressive detention of material witnesses [was] vital to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks. Since that time, the Department of Justice has used the federal material witness statute (18 U.S.C. Section 3144) to arrest …

Down To The Wire: Assessing The Constitutionality Of The National Security Agency's Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit The Rule Of Law, Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr., Robert B. Shaw

UF Law Faculty Publications

The article discusses the constitutionality of warrantless wiretapping surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) on U.S. citizens. The wiretapping program existed weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks, on the justification that Congress authorized the president to wiretap U.S. citizens without a warrant, and that the president had inherent authority as commander-in-chief. But it is argued that Congress did not expressly authorize the president to conduct warrantless wiretapping and that he does not have such inherent authority.

We intend this Article to be a commentary on the constitutionality of the NSA wiretapping program solely as it relates to the …

Indefinite Material Witness Detention Without Probable Cause: Thinking Outside The Fourth Amendment, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

A constitutional issue recently addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2003), has not received the widespread attention of high-profile litigation concerning the Justice Department's other controversial counter-terrorism policies. It is equally important. The issue arises out of Attorney General Ashcroft's announcement shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that the aggressive detention of material witnesses [was] vital to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks. Since that time, the Department of Justice has used the federal material witness statute (18 U.S.C. Section 3144) to …