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Full-Text Articles in Military, War, and Peace

Full Spectrum Space Deterrence: From Laws To Technology, Joshua Carlson Mar 2021

Full Spectrum Space Deterrence: From Laws To Technology, Joshua Carlson

Honors Theses

Conflict in space is becoming an ever-real possibility, with the potential of rendering the space completely useless for future generations. Current talks are centered around limiting or preventing any weapons deployed to space, but this is not the most effective way of dealing with the issue. The focus should shift to agreeing on how nations should act responsibly in space together instead of preventing nations from acting at all. The best way of accomplishing this goal is by improving satellite design, creating agreed upon and understood rules of engagement, fostering widespread cooperation between nations, and choosing not to be the …


Brandishing Our Air, Space, And Cyber Swords: Recommendations For Deterrence And Beyond, Mark Reith Jan 2017

Brandishing Our Air, Space, And Cyber Swords: Recommendations For Deterrence And Beyond, Mark Reith

Faculty Publications

This article examines how the nation could better prepare to deter aggressive action in space and cyberspace, and if necessary, prevail should deterrence fail. The key themes throughout this article include a strong need for space and cyber situational awareness, the need for an international attribution and escalation framework, and a national investment in space and cyber education, along with an updated national strategy and military doctrine. Although related, this article focuses on deterrence and avoids the topic of cyber coercion.


Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions, Matthew C. Waxman Jan 2017

Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Important international law questions for formulating cyber strategy and policy include whether and when a cyber-attack amounts to an “act of war,” or, more precisely, an “armed attack” triggering a right of self-defense, and how the international legal principle of “sovereignty” could apply to cyber activities. International law in this area is not settled. There is, however, ample room within existing international law to support a strong cyber strategy, including a powerful deterrent. The answers to many international law questions discussed below depend on specific, case-by-case facts, and are likely to be highly contested for a long time to come. …


The Power To Threaten War, Matthew C. Waxman Jan 2014

The Power To Threaten War, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Existing war powers scholarship focuses overwhelmingly on the President's power to initiate military operations abroad and the extent to which that power is constrained by Congress. It ignores the allocation of legal power to threaten military force or war, even though threats – to coerce or deter enemies and to reassure allies – are one of the most important ways in which the United States government wields its military might. This paper fills that scholarly void, and draws on recent political science and historical scholarship to construct a richer and more accurate account of the modern presidency's powers to shape …


Signals, Threats, And Deterrence: Alive And Well In The Taiwan Strait, Glenn R. Butterton Jan 1997

Signals, Threats, And Deterrence: Alive And Well In The Taiwan Strait, Glenn R. Butterton

Articles

Taiwan held its first democratic presidential elections in March 1996, which motivated mainland China to stage large scale contemporaneous war games in the Taiwan Strait and aim unusually belligerent rhetoric at Taipei. The United States responded by deploying substantial naval forces in the area. After examining this confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States in terms of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, international law, and non-nuclear deterrence theory, the author presents a novel analysis of indirect deterrence communication between the United States and China