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Full-Text Articles in Legislation

Challenges To The Independence Of Inspectors General In Robust Congressional Oversight, Fernando R. Laguarda Jan 2021

Challenges To The Independence Of Inspectors General In Robust Congressional Oversight, Fernando R. Laguarda

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Congressional oversight of the Executive is among the chief responsibilities of the legislative branch. Inspectors General ("IGs") are among the most important tools available to Congress because they are "hard-wired" into the Executive itself. The value of IGs to Congress depends on their expertise in the workings of their host agencies and their "independence" from those agencies. But "independence" is not a statutorily defined term. As the agencies, and sometimes Congress itself, expand the role of IGs to engage in activities that parallel the regulatory programs of their host agencies, IG independence is compromised and the value IGs provide to …


Passing The Torch But Sailing Too Close To The Wind: Congress’S Role In Authorizing Administrative Branches To Promulgate Regulations That Contemplate Criminal Sanctions, Reem Sadik Nov 2014

Passing The Torch But Sailing Too Close To The Wind: Congress’S Role In Authorizing Administrative Branches To Promulgate Regulations That Contemplate Criminal Sanctions, Reem Sadik

Legislation and Policy Brief

The Supreme Court has stated that Congress must simply “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. If this is done, a court will find the delegation of broad authority to the agency to be constitutional. There is, however, an open issue regarding whether the “intelligible principle” standard applies to delegations of authority that allow for the promulgation of both civil and criminal penalties. In Touby v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked whether “something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is required” when Congress authorizes an agency to issue regulations that contemplate …


Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson Jan 2014

Congress As A Catalyst Of Patent Reform At The Federal Circuit, Jonas Anderson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the dominant institution in patent law. The court’s control over patent law and policy has led to a host of academic proposals to shift power away from the court and towards other institutions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and federal district courts. Surprisingly, however, academics have largely dismissed Congress as a potential institutional check on the Federal Circuit. Congress, it is felt, is too slow, too divided, and too beholden to special interests to effectively monitor changes in innovation and respond with appropriate reforms. …


The Future Of Limitless Debate: The Filibuster In The 113th Congress, Mark Kogan Aug 2012

The Future Of Limitless Debate: The Filibuster In The 113th Congress, Mark Kogan

Legislation and Policy Brief

Human cloning, the caning of teen vandals, and the belief that aliens descend from space to abduct humans and livestock all hold something in common: they are more popular than Congress. With the 112th Congress bottoming out at a record-low 9% approval rating, it is clear that Americans are deeply unsatisfied with the gridlock gripping Washington. While it is popular, and even easy, to lambaste Republicans for blanket obstructionism and to condemn Democrats for failure to stand up to minority bullying, collective blame shifting will not breach the dam of a hyper-partisan Congress. Instead, individuals hoping to get Congress moving …


Acta’S Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not A Treaty, Sean Flynn Jan 2011

Acta’S Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not A Treaty, Sean Flynn

Joint PIJIP/TLS Research Paper Series

The planned entry of the U.S. into the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) poses a unique Constitutional problem. The problem is that the President lacks constitutional authority to bind the U.S. to the agreement without congressional consent; but that lack of authority may not prevent the U.S. from being bound to the agreement under international law. If the administration succeeds in its plan, ACTA may be a binding international treaty (under international law) that is not a treaty (under U.S. Constitutional law).