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When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
Washington and Lee Law Review
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to understand …
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
Washington and Lee Law Review
Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same subject,” the court …