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Full-Text Articles in Legislation
Baker V. State And The Promise Of The New Judicial Federalism, Charles Baron, Lawrence Friedman
Baker V. State And The Promise Of The New Judicial Federalism, Charles Baron, Lawrence Friedman
Charles H. Baron
In Baker v. State, the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled that the state constitution’s Common Benefits Clause prohibits the exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and protections of marriage. Baker has been praised by constitutional scholars as a prototypical example of the New Judicial Federalism. The authors agree, asserting that the decision sets a standard for constitutional discourse by dint of the manner in which each of the opinions connects and responds to the others, pulls together arguments from other state and federal constitutional authorities, and provides a clear basis for subsequent development of constitutional principle. This Article explores …
The Implausibility Of Secrecy, Mark Fenster
The Implausibility Of Secrecy, Mark Fenster
Mark Fenster
Government secrecy frequently fails. Despite the executive branch’s obsessive hoarding of certain kinds of documents and its constitutional authority to do so, recent high-profile events—among them the WikiLeaks episode, the Obama administration’s celebrated leak prosecutions, and the widespread disclosure by high-level officials of flattering confidential information to sympathetic reporters—undercut the image of a state that can classify and control its information. The effort to control government information requires human, bureaucratic, technological, and textual mechanisms that regularly founder or collapse in an administrative state, sometimes immediately and sometimes after an interval. Leaks, mistakes, open sources—each of these constitutes a path out …
Lawmakers As Lawbreakers, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov
Lawmakers As Lawbreakers, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov
Dr. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov
How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? Canlawmakers be trusted to police themselves? This Article examinesCongress’s capacity and incentives to enforce upon itself “the law ofcongressional lawmaking”—a largely overlooked body of law that iscompletely insulated from judicial enforcement. The Article exploresthe political safeguards that may motivate lawmakers to engage inself-policing and rule-following behavior. It identifies the majorpolitical safeguards that can be garnered from the relevant legal,political science, political economy, and social psychology scholarship,and evaluates each safeguard by drawing on a combination oftheoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress. TheArticle’s main argument is that the political safeguards that …