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Full-Text Articles in Legislation
Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan
Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan
Donald J. Kochan
Public Actors In Private Markets: Toward A Developmental Finance State, Robert Hockett, Saule Omarova
Public Actors In Private Markets: Toward A Developmental Finance State, Robert Hockett, Saule Omarova
Saule T. Omarova
The recent financial crisis brought into sharp relief fundamental questions about the social function and purpose of the financial system, including its relation to the “real” economy. This Article argues that, to answer these questions, we must recapture a distinctively American view of the proper relations among state, financial market, and development. This programmatic vision – captured in what we call a “developmental finance state” – is based on three key propositions: (1) that economic and social development is not an “end-state” but a continuing national policy priority; (2) that the modalities of finance are the most potent means of …
Minding The Gaps: Fairness, Welfare, And The Constitutive Structure Of Distributive Assessment, Robert C. Hockett
Minding The Gaps: Fairness, Welfare, And The Constitutive Structure Of Distributive Assessment, Robert C. Hockett
Robert C. Hockett
Despite over a century’s disputation and attendant opportunity for clarification, the field of inquiry now loosely labeled “welfare economics” (WE) remains surprisingly prone to foundational confusions. The same holds of work done by many practitioners of WE’s influential offshoot, normative “law and economics” (LE). A conspicuous contemporary case of confusion turns up in recent discussion concerning “fairness versus welfare.” The very naming of this putative dispute signals a crude category error. “Welfare” denotes a proposed object of distribution. “Fairness” describes and appropriate pattern of distribution. Welfare itself is distributed fairly or unfairly. “Fairness versus welfare” is analytically on all fours …
Foreword — Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Peter M. Shane, Christopher J. Walker
Foreword — Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Peter M. Shane, Christopher J. Walker
Christopher J. Walker
This Foreword introduces a Fordham Law Review symposium held in March 2014 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The most-cited administrative-law decision of all time, Chevron has sparked thirty years of scholarly discussion concerning what Chevron deference means, when (or even if) it should apply, and what impact it has had on the administrative state. Part I of the Foreword discusses the symposium contributions that address Chevron’s scope and application, especially in light of City of Arlington v. FCC. Part II introduces the contributions that explore empirically and theoretically Chevron’s impact outside of …
The Implausibility Of Secrecy, Mark Fenster
The Implausibility Of Secrecy, Mark Fenster
Mark Fenster
Government secrecy frequently fails. Despite the executive branch’s obsessive hoarding of certain kinds of documents and its constitutional authority to do so, recent high-profile events—among them the WikiLeaks episode, the Obama administration’s celebrated leak prosecutions, and the widespread disclosure by high-level officials of flattering confidential information to sympathetic reporters—undercut the image of a state that can classify and control its information. The effort to control government information requires human, bureaucratic, technological, and textual mechanisms that regularly founder or collapse in an administrative state, sometimes immediately and sometimes after an interval. Leaks, mistakes, open sources—each of these constitutes a path out …
Functional Government In 3-D, Robert L. Glicksman, Alejandro E. Camacho
Functional Government In 3-D, Robert L. Glicksman, Alejandro E. Camacho
Robert L. Glicksman
The creation of new administrative agencies and the realignment of existing governmental authority are commonplace and high-stakes events, as illustrated by the recent creation of the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 and of new financial regulatory agencies after the global recession of 2009. Scholars and policymakers have not devoted sufficient attention to this subject, failing to clearly identify the different dimensions along which government authority may be structured or to consider the relationships among them. Analysis of these institutional design issues typically also gives short shrift to whether authority should be allocated differently based on agency function. These failures …
The Inefficiencies Of Legislative Centralization: Evidence From Chinese Provincial Tax Rate Setting, Wei Cui
The Inefficiencies Of Legislative Centralization: Evidence From Chinese Provincial Tax Rate Setting, Wei Cui
Wei Cui
Legislative power in China is centralized to an unusual degree, both in comparison to other countries and relative to the country’s high degree of administrative decentralization. Given its a priori inefficiencies, this arrangement should be significant from both positive and normative perspectives, but, surprisingly, has received little attention in legal and social scientific scholarship. We devise a novel method for analyzing the inefficiencies of centralization through studying provincial government behavior, examining provincial rate setting for the vehicle and vessel tax (VVT) in 2007 and 2011. Because all provinces have assigned VVT revenue and VVT administration to sub-provincial governments, provincial rate-setting …
Delivering The Goods: Herein Of Mead, Delegations, And Authority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
Delivering The Goods: Herein Of Mead, Delegations, And Authority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
Patrick McKinley Brennan
This paper argues, first, that the natural law position, according to which it is the function of human law and political authorities to instantiate certain individual goods and the common good of the political community, does not entail judges' having the power or authority to speak the natural law directly. It goes on to argue, second, that lawmaking power/authority must be delegated by the people or their representatives. It then argues, third, that success in making law depends not just on the exercise of delegated power/authority, but also on the exercise of care and deliberation or, in the article's terms, …