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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Legislation
The Implausibility Of Secrecy, Mark Fenster
The Implausibility Of Secrecy, Mark Fenster
Mark Fenster
Government secrecy frequently fails. Despite the executive branch’s obsessive hoarding of certain kinds of documents and its constitutional authority to do so, recent high-profile events—among them the WikiLeaks episode, the Obama administration’s celebrated leak prosecutions, and the widespread disclosure by high-level officials of flattering confidential information to sympathetic reporters—undercut the image of a state that can classify and control its information. The effort to control government information requires human, bureaucratic, technological, and textual mechanisms that regularly founder or collapse in an administrative state, sometimes immediately and sometimes after an interval. Leaks, mistakes, open sources—each of these constitutes a path out …
The Inefficiencies Of Legislative Centralization: Evidence From Chinese Provincial Tax Rate Setting, Wei Cui
The Inefficiencies Of Legislative Centralization: Evidence From Chinese Provincial Tax Rate Setting, Wei Cui
Wei Cui
Legislative power in China is centralized to an unusual degree, both in comparison to other countries and relative to the country’s high degree of administrative decentralization. Given its a priori inefficiencies, this arrangement should be significant from both positive and normative perspectives, but, surprisingly, has received little attention in legal and social scientific scholarship. We devise a novel method for analyzing the inefficiencies of centralization through studying provincial government behavior, examining provincial rate setting for the vehicle and vessel tax (VVT) in 2007 and 2011. Because all provinces have assigned VVT revenue and VVT administration to sub-provincial governments, provincial rate-setting …