Legal Writing and Research Commons^™

Requiring The Executive To Turn Square Corners: The Supreme Court Increases Agency Accountability In Department Of Homeland Security V. Regents Of The University Of California, Claudia J. Bernstein

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Administrative agencies frequently promulgate rules that have dramatic effects on peoples’ lives. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) is one such example. DACA grants certain unlawful immigrants a temporary reprieve from deportation, as well as ancillary benefits such as work permits. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sought to rescind DACA on the basis that the program violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.

This Comment analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision about DACA’s recission in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of University of California. In rejecting DHS’s attempt to rescind DACA, the Court strengthened agency accountability …

Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, Christopher J. Walker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

We now live in a regulatory world, where the bulk of federal lawmaking takes place at the bureaucratic level. Gone are the days when statutes and common law predominated. Instead, federal agencies—through rulemaking, adjudication, and other regulatory action—have arguably become the primary lawmakers, with Congress delegating to its bureaucratic agents vast swaths of lawmaking power, the President attempting to exercise some control over this massive regulatory apparatus, and courts struggling to constrain agency lawmaking within statutory and constitutional bounds. This story is not new. Over two decades ago, for instance, Professor Lawson lamented the rise of the administrative state and …

Legislating Chevron, Elizabeth Garrett

Michigan Law Review

One of the most significant administrative law cases, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, lnc., is routinely referred to as the "counter-Marbury." The reference suggests that Chevron's command to courts to defer to certain reasonable agency interpretations of statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with the declaration in Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." According to the consensus view, Chevron deference is consistent with Marbury, as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the power to make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling …