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Full-Text Articles in Legal Remedies

Consumers, Sellers-Advisors, And The Psychology Of Trust, Kelli Alces Williams, Justin Sevier Mar 2018

Consumers, Sellers-Advisors, And The Psychology Of Trust, Kelli Alces Williams, Justin Sevier

Scholarly Publications

Every day, consumers ask sellers for advice. Because they do not or cannot know better, consumers rely on that advice in making financial decisions of varying significance. Sellers, motivated by strong and often conflicting self-interests, are well-positioned to lead consumers to make decisions that are profitable for sellers and may be harmful to the consumers themselves. Short of imposing fraud liability in extreme situations, the law neither protects the trust consumers place in “seller-advisors,” nor alerts them to the incentives motivating the advice that sellers give. This Article makes several contributions to the literature. First, it identifies and defines the …


Time Is Money: An Empirical Assessment Of Non-Economic Damages Arguments, John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson Jan 2017

Time Is Money: An Empirical Assessment Of Non-Economic Damages Arguments, John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

Non-economic damages (pain and suffering) are the most significant and variable components of liability. Our survey of fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions shows wide heterogeneity in whether attorneys may quantify damages as time-units of suffering (per diem) or demand a specific amount (lump sum). Either sort of large number could exploit an irrational anchoring effect. We performed a realistic, online, video-based experiment with 732 human subjects. We replicated prior work showing that large lump sum demands drive larger jury verdicts, but surprisingly found no effect of similarly-sized per diem anchors. We did find per diem effects on binary liability outcomes, and thus …


Countering The Plaintiff’S Anchor: Jury Simulations To Evaluate Damages Arguments, John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum Jan 2016

Countering The Plaintiff’S Anchor: Jury Simulations To Evaluate Damages Arguments, John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

Numerous studies have shown that the amount of a juror's damages decision is strongly affected by the number suggested by the plaintiffs attorney, independent of the strength of the actual evidence (a psychological effect known as "anchoring"). For scholars and policymakers, this behavior is worrisome for the legitimacy and accuracy of jury decisions, especially in the domain of non-economic damages (e.g., pain and suffering). One noted paper even concluded that "the more you ask for, the more you get. " Others believe that the damage demand must pass the "straight-face" test because outlandishly high demands will diminish credibility and risk …


The Costs Of Changing Our Minds, Nita A. Farahany Jan 2014

The Costs Of Changing Our Minds, Nita A. Farahany

Faculty Scholarship

This isn’t quite a draft yet – it’s a concept paper. You’ll see after the first 10 pages a good bit of text in brackets, which are primarily notes for me, but it’ll give you a sense of the content of those sections. I’d like to talk through the concept – the “duty” to mitigate emotional distress damages and how courts have struggled with it, as a foray into a broader dichotomy that I see in a number of areas of law that suggest an implicit value in “cognitive liberty.” This is a smaller version of a broader book project …


Instructing Juries On Noneconomic Contract Damages, David A. Hoffman, Alexander Radus Jan 2012

Instructing Juries On Noneconomic Contract Damages, David A. Hoffman, Alexander Radus

All Faculty Scholarship

Gathering pattern contract jury instructions from every State, we examine jurisdictions' treatment of noneconomic damages. While the conventional account holds that there is a uniform preference against awards of noneconomic damages, we find four different approaches in pattern instructions, with only one state explicitly prohibiting juries from considering noneconomic losses. Lay juries have considerably more freedom to award the promisee's noneconomic damages than the hornbooks would have us believe. We substantiate this claim with an online survey experiment asking respondents about a common contract case, and instructing them using the differing pattern forms. We found that subjects routinely awarded more …


Tort Damages And The New Science Of Happiness, Rick Swedloff, Peter H. Huang Jan 2010

Tort Damages And The New Science Of Happiness, Rick Swedloff, Peter H. Huang

Publications

The happiness revolution is coming to legal scholarship. Based on empirical data about the how and why of positive emotions, legal scholars are beginning to suggest reforms to legal institutions. In this article we aim to redirect and slow down this revolution.

One of their first targets of these legal hedonists is the jury system for tort damages. In several recent articles, scholars have concluded that early findings about hedonic adaptation and affective forecasting undermine tort awards for pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-economic damages. In the shadow of a broader debate about …


Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2005

Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

The ideal of individual freedom and autonomy requires that society provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often translated into rules that operate "postcoercion" to undo the legal consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This Article argues that these ex post antiduress measures, rather than helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is credible-when a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome underlies the surrender of the coerced party-ex post relief will only induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome ex ante, without offering the choice to surrender, …


Threatening An Irrational Breach Of Contract, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2004

Threatening An Irrational Breach Of Contract, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

When circumstances surrounding the contract change, a party might consider breach a more attractive option than performance. Threatening breach, this party may induce the other party to modify the original agreement. The contract law doctrine of modification determines whether and when these modifications are enforceable. To promote social welfare as well as the interests of the threatened party, the law should enforce modifications if and only if the modification demand is backed by a credible threat to breach. This paper argues that credibility is not a function of pecuniary interests alone. A decision to breach can be motivated also by …


Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2002

Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Evidence of corporate risk-cost balancing often leads to inefficient punitive damages awards, suggesting that jurors fail to base their decision making on principles of economic efficiency. In this Article, Professor Viscusi presents the results of two experiments regarding jury behavior and punitive damages. In the first experiment, Professor Viscusi found that mock jurors punish companies for balancing risk against cost, although award levels vary depending on how the economic analysis is presented at trial. The results of the second experiment suggested that mock jurors are unwilling or unable to follow a set of model jury instructions designed to generate efficient …


Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud Jan 1991

Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many cases, to agree …


Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, Herbert F. Goodrich Jan 1922

Emotional Disturbance As Legal Damage, Herbert F. Goodrich

Articles

MENTAL pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone. Lord Wensleydale's famous dictum in Lynch v. Knight will serve as a starting point for this discussion. His lordship's notion of mental pain is evidently that of a "state of mind" or feeling, hidden in the inner consciousness of the individual; an intangible, evanescent something too elusive for the hardheaded workaday common law to handle. Likewise, in that very interesting problem regarding recovery for damages sustained through fright, it is always assumed, tacitly or expressly, that mere …