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Full-Text Articles in Legal Profession

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff Jan 2017

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

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Top law firms are notoriously competitive, fighting for prime clients and matters. But some of the most elite firms are also deeply cooperative, willingly sharing key details about their finances and strategy with their rivals. More surprisingly, they pay handsomely to do so. Nearly half of the AmLaw 100 and 200 belong to mutual insurance organizations that require member firms to provide capital; partner time; and important information about their governance, balance sheets, risk management, strategic plans, and malpractice liability. To answer why these firms do so when there are commercial insurers willing to provide coverage with fewer burdens, we …


Liability Insurer Data As A Window On Lawyers’ Professional Liability, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff Jan 2015

Liability Insurer Data As A Window On Lawyers’ Professional Liability, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

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Using the best publicly available data on lawyers’ liability claims and insurance – from the largest insurer of large law firms in the U.S., the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Professional Liability, and a summary of large claims from a leading insurance broker–this article reports the frequency of lawyers’ liability claims, the distribution and cost of claims by type of practice, the disposition of claims, and lawyers liability insurance premiums from the early 1980s to 2013. Notable findings include remarkable stability over thirty years in the distribution of claims by area of practice among both small and large firms, …


Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown In Our Constitutional System, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Jan 2010

Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown In Our Constitutional System, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.

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No abstract provided.


The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick Jan 2007

The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

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Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.


Foreword: Causes And Limits Of Pessimism, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 2000

Foreword: Causes And Limits Of Pessimism, Stephen B. Burbank

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No abstract provided.


Transforming Punishment Into Compensation: In The Shadow Of Punitive Damages, Tom Baker Jan 1998

Transforming Punishment Into Compensation: In The Shadow Of Punitive Damages, Tom Baker

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No abstract provided.