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Full-Text Articles in Legal Profession

Rhetoric Of Disputes In The Courts, The Media, And The Legislature, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Jan 2006

Rhetoric Of Disputes In The Courts, The Media, And The Legislature, Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Aggregation On The Couch: The Strategic Uses Of Ambiguity And Hypocrisy, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 2006

Aggregation On The Couch: The Strategic Uses Of Ambiguity And Hypocrisy, Stephen B. Burbank

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, Professor Burbank comments on the essays by Professors Nagareda and Issacharoff. Welcoming the opportunity to revisit the interplay between procedure and substantive law and the question of democratic accountability that Professor Nagareda’s essay presents, Professor Burbank concludes that the parts of that essay are greater than the whole. He finds that Professor Nagareda’s pursuit of unifying themes and a general normative theory leads to inconsistencies in classification between procedure and substance and to an impoverished vision of institutional legitimacy. Professor Burbank voices concern that this quest, which is also evident in the current draft of the American …


A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee Jan 2006

A Price Theory Of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry Into The Selection Of Settlement And Litigation Under Uncertainty, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

Conventional wisdom says that economic surplus is created when the cost of litigation is foregone in favor of settlement, a theory flowing from the Coase Theorem. The cost-benefit analysis weighs settlement against the expected value of litigation net of transaction cost. This calculus yields the normative proposition that settlement is a superior form of dispute resolution and so most trials are considered errors. While simple in concept, the prevailing economic model is flawed. This article is a theoretical inquiry into the selection criteria of settlement and trial. It applies principles of financial economics to construct a pricing theory of legal …