Legal History Commons^™

Law As Instrumentality, Jeremiah A. Ho

All Faculty Scholarship

Our conceptions of law affect how we objectify the law and ultimately how we study it. Despite a century’s worth of theoretical progress in American law—from legal realism to critical legal studies movements and postmodernism—the formalist conception of “law as science,” as promulgated by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in the late-nineteenth century, still influences methodologies in American legal education. Subsequent movements of legal thought, however, have revealed that the law is neither scientific nor “objective” in the way the Langdellian formalists once envisioned. After all, the Langdellian scientific objectivity of law itself reflected the dominant class, gender, power, …

Legal Realism And The Conflict Of Laws, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

What did legal realism bring to the conflict of laws? Why was the realist critique of the received wisdom so successful? And why, despite that success, is the realist movement in conflict of laws—and, indeed, the whole American choice of law revolution—seen as a failure?

In this Response, I suggest some brief answers to those questions. Realism, I suggest, is more successful than its critics think—though its project remains unfinished. A better understanding of realism's contributions can show us what work remains in the realist project.

Pragmatic Indeterminacy, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

If, as a result of taking Indeterminacy seriously, we revolutionize the way we teach law and the way we select judges, then we will also revolutionize the way cases are litigated (because the new judges will expect to hear a different kind of argumentation) and the way people order their lives in anticipation of the way their disputes will be decided by these new judges.

Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

How do judges judge? Do they apply law to facts in a mechanical and deliberative way, as the formalists suggest they do, or do they rely on hunches and gut feelings, as the realists maintain? Debate has raged for decades, but researchers have offered little hard evidence in support of either model. Relying on empirical studies of judicial reasoning and decision making, we propose an entirely new model of judging that provides a more accurate explanation of judicial behavior. Our model accounts for the tendency of the human brain to make automatic, snap judgments, which are surprisingly accurate, but which …

Comments On The Comments, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The paper replies to Bix and Soper (Bix 2007; Soper 2007). Bix’s paper raises methodological questions, especially whether a form-theorist merely needs to reflect on form from the arm-chair so to speak. A variety of methods is called for, including conceptual analysis, study of usage, “education in the obvious,” general reflection on the nature of specific functional legal units, empirical research on their operation and effects, and still more. Further methodological remarks are made in response to Soper’s paper. Soper suggests the possibility of substituting “form v. substance” of a unit as the central contrast here rather than form v. …

The Incompatibility Principle, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Formalism In American Contract Law: Classical And Contemporary, Mark L. Movsesian

Faculty Publications

It is a universally acknowledged truth that we live in a formalist era—at least when it comes to American contract law. Much more than the jurisprudence of a generation ago, today's cutting-edge work in American contract scholarship values the formalist virtues of bright-line rules, objective interpretation, and party autonomy. Policing bargains for substantive fairness seems more and more an outdated notion. Courts, it is thought, should refrain from interfering with market exchanges. Private arbitration has displaced courts in the context of many traditional contract disputes. Even adhesion contracts find their defenders, much to the chagrin of communitarian scholars.

This is …

An Ethnography Of Abstractions?, Annelise Riles

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Defensor Fidei: The Travails Of A Post-Realist Formalist, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article explores common formalist themes, asking not whether formalism's aspirations are attainable but why formalists still struggle to attain them in the face of sustained attacks by anti-formalists. After briefly sketching the tenets of formalism in Section I, this Article turns to an examination of Summers' "post-realist formalism." Finally, this Article probes the philosophical and psychological attractions of formalism and suggests that formalism's promise of stability and order may be essential to the effective functioning of the legal system, even if this promise can never be realized.

Redefining Radicalism: A Historical Perspective, Walter J. Walsh

Articles

This Essay suggests that Unger's attack on formalism and objectivism is not so new. After noting the early contributions of Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham, it does so by particular reference to the critique of William Sampson (1764-1836), the banished Irish civil rights lawyer and political activist, who led an intellectual charge upon the American common law more than a century and a half ago. It also suggests that by depicting the common law as incompatible with the egalitarian ideal of a democratic republic, Sampson sowed the seeds of a distinct radical tradition of which the critical legal studies movement …

Separation Of Powers Under The Texas Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Rhetorical Styles On The Fuller Court, Walter F. Pratt

Journal Articles

"Formalism" is the label regularly used to describe judicial opinions of the late nineteenth century. The label is descriptive when used in contradistinction to "instrumentalism." Use of the label, however, has certain drawbacks. For example, there is little objective or empirical evidence to support the application of the two antithetical terms. In addition, a single term cannot reflect whatever diversity of styles may exist among the judges of a single court. This article describes the results of an attempt to rectify those two drawbacks and to determine whether the Justices of the Supreme Court at the turn of the century—while …

Escape From Liberalism: Fact And Value In Karl Llewellyn, Kenneth M. Casebeer

Articles

No abstract provided.