Legal History Commons^™

The Security Court, Matt Steilen

Maryland Law Review Online

The Supreme Court is concerned not only with the limits of our government’s power to protect us, but also with how it protects us. Government can protect us by passing laws that grant powers to its agencies or by conferring discretion on the officers in those agencies. Security by law is preferable to the extent that it promotes rule of law values—certainty, predictability, uniformity, and so on—but, security by discretion is preferable to the extent that it gives government the room it needs to meet threats in whatever form they present themselves. Drawing a line between security by law and …

Will The Supreme Court Still “Seldom Stray Very Far”?: Regime Politics In A Polarized America, Kevin J. Mcmahon

Chicago-Kent Law Review

This Article examines the concept of a “minority Justice,” meaning a Supreme Court Justice appointed by a President who had failed to win the popular vote and confirmed with the support of a majority of senators who had garnered fewer votes in their most recent elections than their colleagues in opposition. Specifically, Neil Gorsuch was the first “minority Justice,” receiving the support of senators who had collected nearly 20 million fewer votes than those in opposition (54,098,387 to 73,425,062). From there, the Article considers the significance this development, first by examining some of the foundational work of the regime politics …

The Forgotten Issue? The Supreme Court And The 2016 Presidential Campaign, Christopher W. Schmidt

Chicago-Kent Law Review

This Article considers how presidential candidates use the Supreme Court as an issue in their election campaigns. I focus in particular on 2016, but I try to make sense of this extraordinary election by placing it in the context of presidential elections over the past century.

In the presidential election of 2016, circumstances seemed perfectly aligned to force the Supreme Court to the front of public debate, but neither Donald Trump nor Hillary Clinton treated the Court as a central issue of their campaigns. Trump rarely went beyond a brief mention of the Court in his campaign speeches; Clinton basically …

The Language Of Neutrality In Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, Carolyn Shapiro

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

At Justice Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, then-Judge Gorsuch repeatedly insisted that judging involves no more than examining the legal materials—like statutes and precedents— and applying them to the facts of the case. There is, he emphasized, no room for a Justice’s “personal views,” and he refused even to state his agreement (or disagreement) with such iconic cases as Loving v. Virginia and Griswold v. Connecticut. Instead, then Judge Gorsuch reiterated only that they were precedents of the Court and thus entitled to respect. Frustrating as his answers may have been to some senators, however, they differed from answers given …

Constructive Ambiguity And Judicial Development Of Insider Trading, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision began what has become a fifty-year project of developing U.S. insider trading regulation through judicial lawmaking. During the course of that project, the courts developed a complex, fraud-based approach to determining the scope of liability. The approach has led, in many cases, to doctrinal uncertainty, a result that is reflected in the recent decisions in Newman, Salman, and Martoma.

n the face of this uncertainty, many commentators have called for a legislative solution. This article argues, however, that the true challenge of insider trading regulation is a lack of consensus about the …