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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Toward A Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture In America, Stephan B. Herpel
Toward A Constitutional Kleptocracy: Civil Forfeiture In America, Stephan B. Herpel
Michigan Law Review
Leonard Levy, the legal historian who has written a number of highly regarded historical studies on various provisions of the United States Constitution, has added to his impressive oeuvre a new study of civil and criminal forfeiture. A License to Steal brings together a discussion of English legal history, a review of a number of Nineteenth Century and late Twentieth Century Supreme Court forfeiture decisions, accounts of actual applications of civil and criminal forfeiture, and a summary and critique of legislative proposals that have been made for reform of the civil forfeiture provisions of the federal drug statute. There is …
"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan
"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan
Donald J. Kochan
This Article reexamines the doctrine of public use under the Takings Clause and its ability to impede takings for private use through an application of public choice theory. It argues that the judicial validation of interest-group capture of the condemnation power through a relaxed public use standard in Takings Clause review can be explained by interest group politics and public choice theory and by institutional tendencies inherent in the independent judiciary. Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it …