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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The Decline Of Oral Argument In The Federal Courts Of Appeals: A Modest Proposal For Reform, David R. Cleveland, Steven Wisotsky
The Decline Of Oral Argument In The Federal Courts Of Appeals: A Modest Proposal For Reform, David R. Cleveland, Steven Wisotsky
Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Chief Or The Court: Article Ii And The Appointment Of Inferior Judicial Officers, James E. Pfander
The Chief Or The Court: Article Ii And The Appointment Of Inferior Judicial Officers, James E. Pfander
Faculty Working Papers
Each year, the Chief Justice of the United States makes a number of appointments to offices within the Article III judicial establishment. On its face, such a Chief-based appointment practice seems hard to square with the text of Article II, which provides for the appointment of inferior officers by the "courts of law." Scholars have noted the switch from a court-based to a Chief-based appointment system, but generally regard the Chief's authority as constitutionally benign. This Essay explores the origins of the Constitution's choice of the "courts" as the repository of appointment power. The decision was made against the backdrop …
No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism And The Limits Of Legal Theory, Gary S. Lawson
No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism And The Limits Of Legal Theory, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Professor Martin H. Redish is on the warpath. Like General Sherman marching toward Atlanta (or Justin Tuck marching toward Tom Brady), Professor Redish, together with Matthew Arnould,1 lays waste to every constitutional theory that he encounters. Originalism, with its “belief that constitutional interpretation should be characterized exclusively by an effort to determine the Constitution’s meaning by means of some form of historical inquiry,”2 generates “an often contrived and opaque veil of historical inquiry”3 that provides “an ideal smokescreen behind which judges may pursue their personal[,] moral, political[,] or economic goals with relative impunity.”4 Nontextual theories, for their part, “permit[] selective …
The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting The Supreme People’S Court Of China, Taisu Zhang
The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting The Supreme People’S Court Of China, Taisu Zhang
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines the institutional motivations that underlie several major developments in the Supreme People's Court of China's recent policy-making. Since 2007, the SPC has sent off a collection of policy signals that escapes sweeping ideological labeling: it has publically embraced a populist view of legal reform by encouraging the use of mediation in dispute resolution and popular participation in judicial policy-making, while continuing to advocate legal professionalization as a long-term policy objective. It has also eagerly attempted to enhance its own institutional competence by promoting judicial efficiency, simplifying key areas of civil law, and expanding its control over lower …
Introduction, Paul Finkelman
Justice John Paul Stevens, Originalist, Diane Marie Amann
Justice John Paul Stevens, Originalist, Diane Marie Amann
Scholarly Works
Commentators, including the author of a recent book on the Supreme Court, often attempt to give each Justice a methodological label, such as “practitioner of judicial restraint,” “legal realist,” “pragmatist,” or “originalist.” This Essay first demonstrates that none of the first three labels applies without fail to Justice John Paul Stevens; consequently, it explores the extent to which Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence paid heed to the fourth method, “originalism.” It looks in particular at Justice Stevens’s opinions in recent cases involving firearms, national security, and capital punishment. Somewhat at odds with conventional wisdom, the Essay reveals Justice Stevens as a kind …