Legal History Commons^™

Kate Chase, The "Sphere Of Women's Work," And Her Influence Upon Her Father's Dissent In Bradwell V. Illinois, Richard Aynes

Richard L. Aynes

Kate Chase was said to be the most beautiful and the most intelligent woman of her age. Her father, Salmon P. Chase, is remembered today as Lincoln’s secretary of the treasury and as a chief judge of the U. S. Supreme Court. In his own time, Chase was considered one of the nation’s political giants; Abraham Lincoln described him as “one and a half times bigger than any other man” he had ever known. Carl Schurz’s summary still echoes today: “More than anyone else he looked the great man. Tall, broad-shouldered, and proudly erect, . . . he was a …

Brief Of Amicus Curiae Wesley Macneil Oliver In Support Of The Petition For Writ Of Certiorari, Wesley Oliver

Wesley M Oliver

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a lawsuit could proceed against John Ashcroft in his individual capacity for the way he detained material witnesses after the Terror of September 11, 2001. Ashcroft allegedly used those he believed to be terrorist suspects as material witnesses when he lacked adequate suspicion to bring formal charges. All of these “witnesses” otherwise qualified for detention under the federal material witness detention statute. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this “pretextual” use of the material witness detention statute clearly violated the Fourth Amendment as it circumvented the probable cause …

Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons From The History Of Income Tax Law In Mandatory Palestine, Assaf Likhovski

Assaf Likhovski

Tax law is a technical area of law which does not seem to be culturally specific. It is thus seen as easily transferable between different societies and cultures. However, tax law is also based on definitions and notions which are not universal (the private sphere, the family, the gift etc.). So, is tax law universal or particular? Is it indeed easily transferable between different societies? And in what ways does tax law reflect ethnic or cultural rather than economic differences? This Article seeks to answer these questions by analyzing one specific example — the history of income tax legislation in …

Кризисный Период Развития Отечественного Юридического Образования (1917-1920 Г.Г.), Leonid G. Berlyavskiy

Leonid G. Berlyavskiy

In 1917-1920 Sovnarkom and Narkompros of the RSFSR have accepted the whole complex of the statutory acts directed on abolition of the Law faculties and simultaneously establishment of the new state high schools and scientific institutions network, under control to the power. The Socialist Academy of Social Studies has been founded as a counterbalance to the project of the Institute of Social Sciences developed within the limits of the Academy of Sciences for social studies, including, jurisprudence, began to be considered as the sphere of the Party apparatus priority interests

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional theory. …

The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article builds on Philip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian insights into constitutional argument and law. I examine the way that we interact with canonical texts as we construct arguments in the forms that Bobbitt has described. I contend that these texts serve as metonyms for larger sets of associated principles and values, and that their invocation usually is not meant to point to the literal meaning of the text itself. This conception helps explain how a canonical text's meaning in constitutional argument can evolve over time, and hopefully offers the creative practitioner some insight into the kinds of arguments that might accomplish …

The Right To Arms In The Living Constitution, David B. Kopel

David B Kopel

This Article presents a brief history of the Second Amendment as part of the living Constitution. From the Early Republic through the present, the American public has always understood the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right to own firearms for self-defense. That view has been in accordance with élite legal opinion, except for a period in part of the twentieth century.

"Living constitutionalism" should be distinguished from "dead constitutionalism." Under the former, courts looks to objective referents of shared public understanding of constitutional values. Examples of objective referents include state constitutions, as well as federal or state laws to protect …

State Court Standards Of Review For The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer

David B Kopel

Cases on the right to arms in state constitutions can provide useful guidance for courts addressing Second Amendment issues. Although some people have claimed that state courts always use a highly deferential version of "reasonableness," this article shows that many courts have employed rigorous standards, including the tools of strict scrutiny, such as overbreadth, narrow tailoring, and less restrictive means. Courts have also used categoricalism (deciding whether something is inside or outside the right) and narrow construction (to prevent criminal laws from conflicting with the right to arms). Even when formally applying "reasonableness," many courts have used reasonableness as a …

The Keystone Of The Second Amendment: Quakers, The Pennsylvania Constitution, And The Questionable Scholarship Of Nathan Kozuskanich, David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer

David B Kopel

Historian Nathan Kozuskanich claims that the Second Amendment-like the arms provision of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution-is only a guarantee of a right of individuals to participate in the militia, in defense of the polity. Kozuskanich’s claim about the Second Amendment is based on two articles he wrote about the original public meaning of the right to arms in Pennsylvania, including the 1776 and 1790 Pennsylvania constitutional arms guarantees.

Part I of this Article provides a straightforward legal history of the right to arms provisions in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution and of the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution. We examine Kozuskanich’s claims about …

Commerce In The Commerce Clause: A Response To Jack Balkin, David B. Kopel, Robert G. Natelson

David B Kopel

The Constitution’s original meaning is its meaning to those ratifying the document during a discrete time period: from its adoption by the Constitutional Convention in late 1787 until Rhode Island’s ratification on May 29, 1790. Reconstructing it requires historical skills, including a comprehensive approach to sources. Jack Balkin’s article Commerce fails to consider the full range of evidence and thereby attributes to the Constitution’s Commerce Clause a scope that virtually no one in the Founding Era believed it had.

Antonio Joaquín Pérez Martínez Y La Independencia En Puebla (1810-1821), Alejandro G. Escobedo Rojas, Juan Pablo Salazar Andreu

Alejandro G Escobedo Rojas

No abstract provided.

Los Recursos De Casación Y Denegada Casación En Puebla, Alejandro G. Escobedo Rojas, Juan Pablo Salazar Andreu

Alejandro G Escobedo Rojas

No abstract provided.

El Seminario Palafoxiano De La Puebla De Los Ángeles. Su Mundo Jurídico En Los Albores Del Siglo Xix, Alejandro G. Escobedo Rojas

Alejandro G Escobedo Rojas

No abstract provided.

A Fractured Establishment's Responses To Social Movement Agitation: The U.S. Supreme Court And The Negotiation Of An Outsider Point Of Entry In Walker V. City Of Birmingham, Carlo A. Pedrioli

Carlo A. Pedrioli

In classical social movement theory, scholars have identified the advocates of change as elements of agitation and the establishment as the entity that responds in an attempt to control the agitators. This classical approach has assumed that the establishment is a generally monolithic entity that responds in a unified manner to the efforts of the advocates of change.

While this approach may accurately characterize some rhetorical situations, it does not necessarily have to characterize all such situations. For example, one could describe the judiciary as a part of the establishment because judges are well-connected and powerful individuals who, in many …

Charles Sumner: History's Misunderstood Idealist, Chad G. Marzen

Chad G. Marzen

Few historical figures in the history of the United States have received such contrasting treatment by historians and scholars than Senator Charles Sumner. One view of Sumner mainly focuses on Sumner as a “Cardboard Yankee,” a figure who was arrogantly too tied to principle and was someone who seldom tried to understand others, was lacking in humor, was a pedant, lacked the judgment and self-control to be effective in settling disputes, and was unable to compromise.

A more recent “revised” interpretation of Sumner contends Sumner was driven into reform movements and politics for two reasons: first, that Sumner believed the …

Race Treason: The Untold Story Of America's Ban On Polygamy, Martha M. Ertman

Martha M. Ertman

Legal doctrines banning polygamy grew out of nineteenth century Americans’ view that Mormons betrayed the nation by engaging in conduct associated with people of color. This article reveals the racial underpinnings of polygamy law by examining cartoons and other antipolygamy rhetoric of the time to demonstrate Sir Henry Maine’s famous observation that the move in progressive societies is “from status to contract.” It frames antipolygamists’ contentions as a visceral defense of racial and sexual status in the face of encroaching contractual thinking. Polygamy, they reasoned, was “natural” for people of color but so “unnatural” for whites as to produce a …

David Hoffman: Life, Letters And Lectures At The University Of Maryland 1821-1837, Bill Sleeman

Bill Sleeman

David Hoffman was a prominent pioneer in the establishment of university-based legal education. He helped to found the University of Maryland Law School in 1816 and was its first professor. His A Course of Legal Study (1817) and Legal Outlines (1829) played a critical role in the development of law school curricula and provided guidance to hundreds of antebellum law students and attorneys.