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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The Paradox Of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, Michael S. Green
The Paradox Of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
According to Locke's theory of the social contract, which was widely accepted by the Founders, political authority is limited by those natural moral rights that individuals reserve against the government. In this Article, I argue that Locke's theory generates paradoxical conclusions concerning the government's authority over civil disobedients, that is, people who resist the government because they believe it is violating reserved moral rights. If the government lacks the authority to compel the civil disobedient to abide by its laws, the result is anarchism: The limits on governmental authority are whatever each individual says they are. If the government has …
Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
In this review essay, Professor Michael Steven Green argues that Dworkin's reputation among his fellow philosophers has needlessly suffered because of his refusal to back down from his "semantic sting" argument against H. L. A. Hart. Philosophers of law have uniformly rejected the semantic sting argument as a fallacy. Nevertheless Dworkin reaffirms the argument in Justice in Robes, his most recent collection of essays, and devotes much of the book to stubbornly, and unsuccessfully, defending it. This is a pity, because the failure of the semantic sting argument in no way undermines Dworkin's other arguments against Hart.
Legal Realism As Theory Of Law, Michael S. Green
Legal Realism As Theory Of Law, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Halpin On Dworkin's Fallacy: A Surreply, Michael S. Green
Halpin On Dworkin's Fallacy: A Surreply, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Hans Kelsen And The Logic Of Legal Systems, Michael S. Green
Hans Kelsen And The Logic Of Legal Systems, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’S Fallacy?: A Reply To Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin’S Fallacy?: A Reply To Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
In an article entitled ‘Dworkin’s Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us about the Law’, I argued that in Law’s Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived his interpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theory of meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin’s fallacy’. In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that he committed the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact that he considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’, ‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—in Law’s Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each, he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning, which he describes …
Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity In The Legal Order, Michael S. Green
Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity In The Legal Order, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
A legal revolution occurs when chains of legal dependence rupture-causing one legal system to be replaced by a different and incommensurable legal system. For example, before the French Revolution chains of legal dependence ultimately led to Louis XVI, but after this legal revolution they led to the National Assembly (or the people of France it represented). The very possibility of legal revolutions depends upon laws being structured into legal systems in this fashion. And yet, despite substantial academic interest in legal revolutions, there has been a reluctance to examine the structure that makes them possible. The goal of this Article …
The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To Rebel Against The State, Michael S. Green
The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Right To Rebel Against The State, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.
Legal Realism, Lex Fori, And The Choice-Of-Law Revolution, Michael S. Green
Legal Realism, Lex Fori, And The Choice-Of-Law Revolution, Michael S. Green
Michael S. Green
No abstract provided.