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Articles 1 - 29 of 29
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The Next Required Law School Course: History Of America’S Foundings, Kevin Frazier
The Next Required Law School Course: History Of America’S Foundings, Kevin Frazier
St. Mary's Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Akhil Amar’S Unusable Past, Gregory Ablavsky
Akhil Amar’S Unusable Past, Gregory Ablavsky
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Words That Made Us: America’s Constitutional Conversation, 1760–1840. By Akhil Reed Amar.
Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt
Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt
Arkansas Law Review
In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …
The Lost History Of Delegation At The Founding, Christine Chabot
The Lost History Of Delegation At The Founding, Christine Chabot
Georgia Law Review
The new Supreme Court is poised to bring the administrative state to a grinding halt. Five Justices have endorsed Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United States—an opinion that threatens to invalidate countless regulatory statutes in which Congress has delegated significant policymaking authority to the Executive Branch. Justice Gorsuch claimed that the “text and history” of the Constitution required the Court to replace a longstanding constitutional doctrine that permits broad delegations with a more restrictive one. But the supposedly originalist arguments advanced by Justice Gorsuch and like-minded scholars run counter to the understandings of delegation that prevailed in the Founding …
The Other Ordinary Persons, Fred O. Smith, Jr.
The Other Ordinary Persons, Fred O. Smith, Jr.
Washington and Lee Law Review
If originalism aims to center the original public meaning of text, who constitutes “the public”? Are we doing enough to capture historically excluded voices: impoverished white planters; dispossessed Natives; silenced women; and the enslaved? If not, what more is required? And for those who are not originalists, how do we ensure that, as American law consults the wisdom of the ages, we do not sever entire sources of wisdom?
This brief symposium Article engages these themes, offering two modest, interrelated claims. The first is that important informational, ethical, and democratic benefits accrue when American legal doctrine includes the voices and …
Greenbacks, Consent, And Unwritten Amendments, John M. Bickers
Greenbacks, Consent, And Unwritten Amendments, John M. Bickers
Arkansas Law Review
I remember a German farmer expressing as much in a few words as the whole subject requires: “money is money, and paper is paper.”—All the invention of man cannot make them otherwise. The alchymist may cease his labours, and the hunter after the philosopher’s stone go to rest, if paper cannot be metamorphosed into gold and silver, or made to answer the same purpose in all cases. Every day Americans spend paper money, using it as legal tender. Yet the Constitution makes no mention of this phenomenon. Indeed, it clearly prevents the states from having the authority to make paper …
Is Solitary Confinement A Punishment?, John F. Stinneford
Is Solitary Confinement A Punishment?, John F. Stinneford
Northwestern University Law Review
The United States Constitution imposes a variety of constraints on the imposition of punishment, including the requirements that the punishment be authorized by a preexisting penal statute and ordered by a lawful judicial sentence. Today, prison administrators impose solitary confinement on thousands of prisoners despite the fact that neither of these requirements has been met. Is this imposition a “punishment without law,” or is it a mere exercise of administrative discretion? In an 1890 case called In re Medley, the Supreme Court held that solitary confinement is a separate punishment subject to constitutional restraints, but it has ignored this …
Foreign-Born Children Of Disloyal Parents: Adam Muthana, Mary Arcedeckne, And The Natural-Born, John Vlahoplus
Foreign-Born Children Of Disloyal Parents: Adam Muthana, Mary Arcedeckne, And The Natural-Born, John Vlahoplus
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
Can Adam Muthana, the foreign-born child of an alien Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) combatant and a New Jersey-born ISIS adherent, grow up to be president of the United States? He can if he attains the age of thirty-five, resides in the United States for fourteen years, and is a natural-born citizen. He has a facial claim to statutory derivative citizenship at birth through his mother, and some scholars argue that anyone who is a citizen at birth is a natural-born citizen. Nevertheless, there are significant disputes over whether he will be allowed to reside here, whether …
Evaluating Originalism: Commerce And Emoluments, John Vlahoplus
Evaluating Originalism: Commerce And Emoluments, John Vlahoplus
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
This Article suggests that originalist theories share a core focus that meaningfully competes with pluralist theories. The contest is real and appears in centuries of debates within Anglo-American and civil law. The Article locates the Anglo-American origins of originalism in a novel seventeenth-century method of legal interpretation used to achieve a specific political end: to stifle opposition to the union of Scottish and English subjects of King James after his accession to the English crown in 1603. It details the novel method and the competing traditional method of English legal interpretation. It then evaluates originalist interpretations of the Commerce …
The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding The Cycles Of Constitutional Time, Jack M. Balkin
The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding The Cycles Of Constitutional Time, Jack M. Balkin
Indiana Law Journal
In this Article, I will talk about what I expect is going to happen in the next five to ten years. Unlike eclipses, however, one can’t be entirely sure of the future. Politics is not astronomy, and human affairs do not operate like clockwork. Moreover, we can’t assume that everything is already foreordained: that if people simply sit on their hands and do nothing, the cycles I describe in this lecture will take care of themselves. Quite the contrary. I am telling a story about what happens in the long run, but it is not a deterministic story. The actions …
Originalism And Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt
Originalism And Congressional Power To Enforce The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt
Washington and Lee Law Review Online
In this Essay, I argue that originalism conflicts with the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence defining the scope of Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the standard established in Boerne v. Flores, the Court limits congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to statutory remedies premised on judicially defined interpretations of Fourteenth Amendment rights. A commitment to originalism as a method of judicial constitutional interpretation challenges the premise of judicial interpretive supremacy in Section 5 jurisprudence in two ways. First, as a matter of history, an originalist reading of Section 5 provides support for broad judicial …
The Magic Mirror Of "Original Meaning": Recent Approaches To The Fourteenth Amendment, Bret Boyce
The Magic Mirror Of "Original Meaning": Recent Approaches To The Fourteenth Amendment, Bret Boyce
Maine Law Review
Nearly a century and a half after its adoption, debate continues to rage over the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of basic rights. Of the three clauses in the second sentence of Section One, the latter two (the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) loom very large in modern Supreme Court decisions, while the first (the Privileges or Immunities Clause) is of minimal importance, having been invoked only once to strike down a state law. Originalists—those who hold that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its original meaning—have often deplored this state of affairs. Many have argued …
The Arduous Virtue Of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, And Nerve, Ronald Dworkin
The Arduous Virtue Of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, And Nerve, Ronald Dworkin
Fordham Law Review
Proper constitutional interpretation takes both text and past practice as its object: Lawyers and judges faced with a contemporary constitutional issue must try to construct a coherent, principled, and persuasive interpretation of the text of particular clauses, the structure of the Constitution as a whole, and our history under the Constitution—an interpretation that both unifies these distinct sources, so far as this is possible, and directs future adjudication. They must seek, that is, constitutional integrity. So fidelity to the Constitution's text does not exhaust constitutional interpretation, and on some occasions overall constitutional integrity might require a result that could …
Saving Originalism, Robert J. Delahunty, John Yoo
Saving Originalism, Robert J. Delahunty, John Yoo
Michigan Law Review
It is sometimes said that biographers cannot help but come to admire, even love, their subjects. And that adage seems to ring true of Professor Amar, the foremost “biographer” of the Constitution. He loves it not just as a governing structure, or a political system, but as a document. He loves the Constitution in the same way that a fan of English literature might treasure Milton’s Paradise Lost or Shakespeare’s Macbeth. He loves the Constitution not just for the good: the separation of powers, federalism, and the Bill of Rights. He also loves it for its nooks and crannies, idiosyncrasies, …
Originalism And The Ratification Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Thomas B. Colby
Originalism And The Ratification Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Thomas B. Colby
Northwestern University Law Review
Originalists have traditionally based the normative case for originalism primarily on principles of popular sovereignty: the Constitution owes its legitimacy as higher law to the fact that it was ratified by the American people through a supermajoritarian process. As such, it must be interpreted according to the original meaning that it had at the time of ratification. To give it another meaning today is to allow judges to enforce a legal rule that was never actually embraced and enacted by the people. Whatever the merits of this argument in general, it faces particular hurdles when applied to the Fourteenth Amendment. …
Calling Them As He Sees Them: The Disappearance Of Originalism In Justice Thomas's Opinions On Race, Joel K. Goldstein
Calling Them As He Sees Them: The Disappearance Of Originalism In Justice Thomas's Opinions On Race, Joel K. Goldstein
Maryland Law Review
During his first two decades on the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas has been associated with originalism and is often viewed as its leading judicial proponent. Justice Thomas has linked originalism with the effort to limit judicial discretion and to promote judicial impartiality. In cases dealing with many constitutional provisions, Justice Thomas has shown his commitment to originalism by often writing solitary concurrences and dissents advocating an originalist analysis of a problem. Yet in constitutional cases dealing with race, Justice Thomas routinely abandons originalism and embraces the sort of constitutional arguments based on morality or consequentialism that he often discounts. These …
Original Intent And The Fourteenth Amendment: Into The Black Hole Of Constitutional Law, Paul Finkelman
Original Intent And The Fourteenth Amendment: Into The Black Hole Of Constitutional Law, Paul Finkelman
Chicago-Kent Law Review
This article explores and examines William E. Nelson’s masterful study of the origins and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principal to Judicial Doctrine (1988). The article explains that a quarter of a century after he wrote this book, Nelson’s study of the origins and adoption of the Amendment remains the best exploration of these issues. His book illustrates the difficulties of determining the “original intent” of the framers of this complicated and complex Amendment. At the same time, however, Nelson demonstrates that for many issues we can come to a strong understanding of the goals …
Rejecting The Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson's Scholarship On Judge Edward Weinfeld And Justice Byron White, Brad Snyder
Rejecting The Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson's Scholarship On Judge Edward Weinfeld And Justice Byron White, Brad Snyder
Chicago-Kent Law Review
My contribution to this tribute places Bill Nelson’s scholarship about Judge Edward Weinfeld and Justice Byron White within several contexts. It is a personal history of Nelson the law student, law clerk, and young scholar; an intellectual history of legal theory since the 1960s; an examination of the influence of legal theory on Nelson’s scholarship based on his writings about Weinfeld and White; and an example of how legal historians contend with the subject of judicial reputation. Nelson was one of many former Warren Court and Burger Court clerks who joined the professoriate and rejected the legal process theory that …
Statutory Interpretation Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making , R. Randall Kelso
Statutory Interpretation Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making , R. Randall Kelso
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Constitution As An Exploding Cigar And Other “Historian’S Heresies” About A Constitutional Orthodoxy, R.B. Bernstein
The Constitution As An Exploding Cigar And Other “Historian’S Heresies” About A Constitutional Orthodoxy, R.B. Bernstein
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
Exposing The Contradiction: An Originalist's Approach To Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is A Constitutional Misinterpretation, Jason A. Crook
Exposing The Contradiction: An Originalist's Approach To Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is A Constitutional Misinterpretation, Jason A. Crook
Nevada Law Journal
Few phrases in American jurisprudence have created more of a stir or inspired greater controversy than the seventeen words that comprise the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Drafted by the Reconstruction Congress in the aftermath of the Civil War, these words have been used to strike down maximum-hours legislation, permit the instruction of foreign languages in schools, and even establish the right of minors to purchase contraceptives. In light of its linguistic incongruity and the versatility of its judicial precedents, one could fairly state that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause has been the subject …
Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Ugly American Hermeneutics, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Nevada Law Journal
This article will appear in a Symposium on comparative legal hermeneutics that includes four articles by American scholars and four articles by Brazilian scholars. I argue that the "ugly American" hermeneutics exemplified in Justice Scalia's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller is unfortunate, even if we supplement Justice Scalia's hermeneutical fantasy with the much more careful and balanced philosophical work by Larry Solum, Keith Whittington and other scholars. Nevertheless, the pragmatic work of interpretation by lawyers and judges in the day-to-day world of legal practice shows a plain-faced integrity of which we Americans can be proud.
Supreme Neglect Of Text And History, William Michael Treanor
Supreme Neglect Of Text And History, William Michael Treanor
Michigan Law Review
Since his classic book Takings appeared in 1985, Richard Epstein's ideas have profoundly shaped debate about the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause to a degree that no other scholar can even begin to approach. His broad, original, and stunningly ambitious reading of the clause has powerfully influenced thinking in academia, in the judiciary, and in the political arena. The firestorm of controvery that followed the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo - in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal urban renewal plan that displaced long-time homeowners and conveyed their land to developers - is in critical part …
Some Effects Of Identity-Based Social Movements On Constitutional Law In The Twentieth Century, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Some Effects Of Identity-Based Social Movements On Constitutional Law In The Twentieth Century, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Michigan Law Review
What motivated big changes in constitutional law doctrine during the twentieth century? Rarely did important constitutional doctrine or theory change because of formal amendments to the document's text, and rarer still because scholars or judges "discovered" new information about the Constitution's original meaning. Precedent and common law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred rather than their driving force. My thesis is that most twentieth century changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were driven by or in response to the great identity-based social movements ("IBSMs") of the twentieth century. Race, sex, and sexual orientation were markers of …
The Second Amendment: Structure, History, And Constitutional Change, David Yassky
The Second Amendment: Structure, History, And Constitutional Change, David Yassky
Michigan Law Review
A fierce debate about the Second Amendment has been percolating in academia for two decades, and has now bubbled through to the courts. The question at the heart of this debate is whether the Amendment restricts the government's ability to regulate the private possession of firearms. Since at least 1939 - when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Miller, its only decision squarely addressing the scope of the right to "keep and bear Arms" - the answer to that question has been an unqualified "no." Courts have brushed aside Second Amendment challenges to gun control legislation, reading the Amendment …
The Treaty Power And American Federalism, Part Ii, Curtis A. Bradley
The Treaty Power And American Federalism, Part Ii, Curtis A. Bradley
Michigan Law Review
In an article published in this Review two years ago, I described and critiqued what I called the "nationalist view" of the treaty power. Under this view, the national government has the constitutional power to enter into treaties, and thereby create binding national law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, without regard to either subject matter or federalism limitations. This view is reflected in the writings of a number of prominent foreign affairs law scholars, as well as in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. In my article, I argued that this …
Recovering The Original Fourth Amendment, Thomas Y. Davies
Recovering The Original Fourth Amendment, Thomas Y. Davies
Michigan Law Review
Claims regarding the original or intended meaning of constitutional texts are commonplace in constitutional argument and analysis. All such claims are subject to an implicit validity criterion - only historically authentic assertions should matter. The rub is that the original meaning commonly attributed to a constitutional text may not be authentic. The historical Fourth Amendment is a case in point. If American judges, lawyers, or law teachers were asked what the Framers intended when they adopted the Fourth Amendment, they would likely answer that the Framers intended that all searches and seizures conducted by government officers must be reasonable given …
The Qualities Of Completeness: More? Or Less?, Mark R. Killenbeck
The Qualities Of Completeness: More? Or Less?, Mark R. Killenbeck
Michigan Law Review
On January 14, 1983, Chief Judge W. Brevard Hand announced what he knew would be widely regarded as a rather startling proposition. Believing that "[t]he first amendment in large part was a guarantee to the states which insured that the states would be able to continue whatever church-state relationship existed in 1791," Judge Hand held that the people of Alabama were perfectly free to "establish[] a religion," in this instance by allowing public school teachers to begin the school day with prayer. The ruling reversed an earlier decision in the same case, which characterized the statutory provision at issue as …
Updating Statutory Interpretation, T. Alexander Aleinikoff
Updating Statutory Interpretation, T. Alexander Aleinikoff
Michigan Law Review
This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. Professor Aleinikoff examines in depth the first issue raised by Professor Farber. Using metaphors of the archeological and the nautical Professor Aleinikoff describes theories of originalism and their application to statutory interpretation. Concluding that there are nonoriginalist (or nonarcheological) elements implicit in these theories, he proceeds to consider how an explicitly nonoriginalist (or nautical) theory of interpretation might work He concludes by commenting on the application of such a theory to Patterson.