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- 19th Amendment (2)
- Suffragists (2)
- Voting Rights (2)
- 8 U.S.C. 1324 (1)
- Criminal Justice (1)
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- Disenfranchisement (1)
- Fifth Amendment (1)
- First Amendment (1)
- Harboring Statute (1)
- In Memoriam (1)
- Juvenile Offenses (1)
- Law review articles (1)
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- Legal podcast (1)
- Military Service (1)
- Prisoner Protests (1)
- Professor Emeritus (1)
- Public use (1)
- Seattle University School of Law (1)
- Sentencing Guidelines (1)
- Silent Sentinels (1)
- Takings clause (1)
- Voting Barriers (1)
- Young Offenders (1)
- Youth Offenders (1)
- Youth Sentencing (1)
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The Weaponization Of The “Alien Harboring” Statute In A New-Era Of Racial Animus Towards Immigrants, Hannah Hamley
The Weaponization Of The “Alien Harboring” Statute In A New-Era Of Racial Animus Towards Immigrants, Hannah Hamley
Seattle University Law Review
Federal law 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), commonly referred to as the “Alien Harboring” statute, was passed sixty-eight years ago and has been used as a weapon against immigrants and their allies. Spanning back decades, numerous scholars, alarmed by the dangerous use of the statute, have written about its muddled congressional intent and the unclear definition of “harboring.” These issues continue to be relevant and are foundational concerns with the enforcement of the harboring statute. However, in the era of President Donald J. Trump, we are faced with a new danger. We are confronted with an Administration that is ferociously anti-immigrant …
“Public Use” Or Public Abuse? A New Test For Public Use In Light Of Kelo, Taylor Haines
“Public Use” Or Public Abuse? A New Test For Public Use In Light Of Kelo, Taylor Haines
Seattle University Law Review
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has long been controversial. It allows the government to take private property for the purpose of “public use.” But what does public use mean? The definition is one of judicial interpretation. It has evolved from the original meaning intended by the drafters of the Constitution. Now, the meaning is extremely broad. This Note argues that both the original and contemporary meaning of public use are problematic. It explores the issues with both definitions and suggests a new test, solidified in legislation instead of judicial interpretation.
Enough Is As Good As A Feast, Noah C. Chauvin
Enough Is As Good As A Feast, Noah C. Chauvin
Seattle University Law Review
Ipse Dixit, the podcast on legal scholarship, provides a valuable service to the legal community and particularly to the legal academy. The podcast’s hosts skillfully interview guests about their legal and law-related scholarship, helping those guests communicate their ideas clearly and concisely. In this review essay, I argue that Ipse Dixit has made a major contribution to legal scholarship by demonstrating in its interview episodes that law review articles are neither the only nor the best way of communicating scholarly ideas. This contribution should be considered “scholarship,” because one of the primary goals of scholarship is to communicate new ideas.
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Seattle University Law Review
Table of Contents
Does The Woman Suffrage Amendment Protect The Voting Rights Of Men?, Steve Kolbert
Does The Woman Suffrage Amendment Protect The Voting Rights Of Men?, Steve Kolbert
Seattle University Law Review
This Article—part of the Seattle University Law Review’s symposium on the centennial of the ratification of the Woman Suffrage Amendment—examines that open possibility. Concluding that the Nineteenth Amendment does protect men’s voting rights, this Article explores why and how that protection empowers Congress to address felon disenfranchisement and military voting. This Article also examines the advantages of using Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation compared to legislation enacted under other constitutional provisions.
Part I discusses the unique barriers to voting faced by voters with criminal convictions (Section I.A) and voters in the armed forces (Section I.B). This Part also explains how existing …
"Inciting A Riot": Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, And Prisoners' Petition And Associational Rights, Nicole B. Godfrey
"Inciting A Riot": Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, And Prisoners' Petition And Associational Rights, Nicole B. Godfrey
Seattle University Law Review
This Article argues for increased legal protections for prisoners who choose to engage in group protest to shed light on the conditions of their incarceration. A companion piece to a similar article that focused on prisoner free speech rights, this Article uses the acts of protest utilized by the Silent Sentinels to examine why prisoners’ rights to petition and association should be strengthened. By strengthening these rights, the Article argues that we will advance the values enshrined by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause while simultaneously advancing the rights of the incarcerated millions with little to no political power.
The Article …
In Memory Of Professor James E. Bond, Janet Ainsworth
In Memory Of Professor James E. Bond, Janet Ainsworth
Seattle University Law Review
Janet Ainsworth, Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law: In Memory of Professor James E. Bond.
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review
Seattle University Law Review
Table of Contents
Washington’S Young Offenders: O’Dell Demands A Change To Sentencing Guidelines, Erika Vranizan
Washington’S Young Offenders: O’Dell Demands A Change To Sentencing Guidelines, Erika Vranizan
Seattle University Law Review
This Note argues that the O’Dell decision was a watershed moment for criminal justice reform. It argues that the reasoning in O’Dell should be seized upon by the legislature to take action to remediate instances in which defendants are legal adults but do not possess the cognitive characteristics of an adult sufficient to justify adult punishment. Given both the scientific impossibility of identifying a precise age at which characteristics of youthfulness end and adulthood begins and the Court’s repeated recognition that these very factors impact culpability, the current approach to sentencing young offenders aged eighteen to twenty-five as adults simply …